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The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has ex-
ploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to 
send its propaganda and messaging out to the world 
and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization. 
By virtue of its large number of supporters and 
highly organized tactics, ISIS has been able to 
exert an outsized impact on how the world per-
ceives it, by disseminating images of graphic vio-
lence (including the beheading of Western jour-
nalists and aid workers and more recently, the 
immolation of a Jordanian air force pilot), while 
using social media to attract new recruits and in-
spire lone actor attacks. 
Although much ink has been spilled on the topic 
of ISIS activity on Twitter, very basic questions re-
main unanswered, including such fundamental is-
sues as how many Twitter users support ISIS, who 
they are, and how many of those supporters take 
part in its highly organized online activities. 
Previous efforts to answer these questions have 
relied on very small segments of the overall ISIS 
social network. Because of the small, cellular na-
ture of that network, the examination of particular 
subsets such as foreign fighters in relatively small 
numbers, may create misleading conclusions. 
The information vacuum extends to—and is par-
ticularly acute within—the sometimes heated dis-
cussion of how the West should respond to this 
online campaign. 
While there are legitimate debates about the 
bounds of free speech and the complex relationship 
between private companies and the public interest, 
some have argued against suspending terrorist so-
cial media accounts on the basis that suspensions 
are not effective at impeding extremist activity on-
line. These arguments that are usually predicated 
on very small samples of potentially misleading 
data, when data is proffered at all. 
We set out to answer some of these important ques-
tions using innovative techniques to create a large, 
representative sample of accounts that can be clear-
ly defined as ISIS supporters, and to attempt to de-
fine the boundaries of ISIS’s online social network.
The goals of the project included:
 
•	Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS support-
ers on Twitter using a very large and accurate 
sample of accounts (addressed in sections 1 and 
2 of this paper). 
•	Outline a methodology for discovering and de-
fining relevant accounts, to serve as a basis for 
future research using consistent comparison 
data (section 3). 
•	Create preliminary data and a path to further 
investigate ISIS-supporting accounts suspend-
ed by Twitter and the effects of suspensions 
(section 2.5). 
Our findings, based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS 
supporter accounts, include: 
•	From September through December 2014, we 
estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts 
were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of 
them were active at the same time. 
•	The 46,000 figure is our most conservative esti-
mate for this time frame. Our maximum estimate 
is in the neighborhood of 70,000 accounts; how-
ever, we believe the truth is closer to the low end 
of the range (sections 1.1, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8). 
•	Typical ISIS supporters were located within the 
organization’s territories in Syria and Iraq, as well 
as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of 
ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with loca-
tion metadata embedded (section 1.4). 
Executive Summary
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•	Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected Eng-
lish as their primary language when using Twit-
ter. Three quarters selected Arabic (section 1.5). 
•	 ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of 
about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher 
than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting 
accounts were also considerably more active than 
non-supporting users (section 2). 
•	Much of ISIS’s social media success can be at-
tributed to a relatively small group of hyperac-
tive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 
accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of 
high volume (section 2.1). 
•	A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts 
were suspended between September and Decem-
ber 2014, and we saw evidence of potentially 
thousands more. Accounts that tweeted most of-
ten and had the most followers were most likely 
to be suspended (section 2.5.1). 
•	At the time our data collection launched in Sep-
tember 2014, Twitter began to suspend large 
numbers of ISIS-supporting accounts. While this 
prevented us from creating a pre-suspension da-
taset, we were able to gather information on how 
the removal of accounts affected the overall net-
work (section 2.5.4). 
•	Account suspensions do have concrete effects in 
limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities on 
social media. They do not, at the current level 
of implementation, eliminate those activities, 
and cannot be expected to do this. Some critics 
argue suspensions are ineffective because ISIS 
propaganda is still available on Twitter. Any bal-
anced evaluation of current levels of suspension 
activity clearly demonstrates that total interdic-
tion is not the goal. The qualitative debate is over 
how suspensions affect the performance of the 
network and whether a different level of pressure 
might produce a different result (sections 2.5, 
4.2). While it is possible to target suspensions 
in a manner that would be far more devastating 
to ISIS networks, we do not advise such an ap-
proach for several reasons (sections 4.1 and 4.3). 
•	The process of suspension does create certain new 
risks. Most importantly, while suspensions ap-
pear to have created obstacles to supporters join-
ing ISIS’s social network, they also isolate ISIS 
supporters online. This could increase the speed 
and intensity of radicalization for those who do 
manage to enter the network, and hinder organic 
social pressures that could lead to deradicaliza-
tion (section 4.3). 
•	Further study is required to evaluate the unin-
tended consequences of suspension campaigns 
and their attendant trade-offs. Fundamentally, 
tampering with social networks is a form of social 
engineering, and acknowledging this fact raises 
many new, difficult questions (section 4.3). 
•	Social media companies and the U.S government 
must work together to devise appropriate re-
sponses to extremism on social media. Although 
discussions of this issue often frame government 
intervention as an infringement on free speech, 
in reality, social media companies currently regu-
late speech on their platforms without oversight 
or disclosures of how suspensions are applied 
(section 4.4). Approaches to the problem of 
extremist use of social media are most likely to 
succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider 
dialogues among the wide range of community, 
private, and public stakeholders. 
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Links among the top 500 Twitter accounts as sorted by the in-group metric used to identify ISIS supporters.  
Red lines indicate reciprocal relationships. 
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Introduction
This study consists of four parts: 
•	 ISIS supporter demographics 
•	 ISIS supporter social media metrics
•	A detailed discussion of the methodology used 
for this paper
•	A preliminary examination of the effects of sus-
pending social media accounts and recommenda-
tions for further study and policies
The first two sections are based on a sample of 
20,000 accounts believed to be comprised of at 
least 93 percent ISIS supporters. We examine where 
these supporters are located, what languages they 
speak, what identifying information they provide, 
when their accounts were created, a limited view 
on what content they post, and the methods they 
use to spread ISIS propaganda and recruit followers 
around the globe. 
The third section discusses in considerable detail 
how we identified these accounts. We believe this 
is a crucial part of the discussion, to allow readers 
to determine how much confidence to place in the 
results, and to establish a framework for future re-
search on the performance of social networks. 
The fourth section discusses some of the impli-
cations and questions raised by this study, par-
ticularly pertaining to the effects of suspending 
extremist social media accounts. This section 
also points to some of the challenges of design-
ing a coherent approach among all stakeholders 
involved in countering the problem of violent 
extremism on social media. 
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1. 
Demographics 
of ISIS Supporters
Who are the users supporting ISIS on Twitter? 
Where do they live, and how do they do their work 
online? These are questions of great importance for 
anyone trying to understand the scope of the prob-
lem and possible remedies. 
Using a variety of innovative approaches, we identi-
fied an accurate dataset of 20,000 ISIS supporter 
accounts on Twitter. Through this sample we aimed 
to estimate the total number of accounts support-
ing ISIS on Twitter and to create a demographic 
profile of this group, shedding light on where us-
ers are based, what languages they speak, what they 
tweet about, and how they access the Internet. 
The demographics data, as well as the Twitter met-
rics discussed in section 2, also shed light on the 
social media strategies ISIS uses to disseminate its 
messages online. 
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1.1 
Estimating the Total Number  
of Supporters
We had hoped to establish both a floor and a ceil-
ing for estimates of the size of ISIS’s supporter base 
on Twitter. A completely reliable ceiling proved 
elusive due to the size of the dataset, its rapid evolu-
tion, and the complexity of the relationships within 
it. However we were able to establish a floor with 
reasonable certainty. 
During the period of October 4 through Novem-
ber 27, 2014, we estimate there were no fewer than 
46,000 Twitter accounts supporting ISIS. Some 
accounts that were active in September but sub-
sequently suspended were relevant to the set, and 
different kinds of information were collected at 
different speeds based on Twitter API limits. This 
figure excludes deceptive tactics meant to inflate 
ISIS’s Twitter following, such as automated bots, 
but includes multiple accounts maintained by hu-
man users. 
This estimate was derived from two sources of data: 
•	We collected extremely robust data on nearly 
50,000 accounts. We estimate that a minimum 
of 30,000 of these are accurately described as 
accounts belonging to ISIS supporters and con-
trolled by a human user, using the most conserva-
tive criteria. We have a high level of confidence 
in this estimate, which is based on samples coded 
under the criteria described in section 3.5 and the 
metrics described in sections 3.6 and 3.7. 
•	We also collected partial data on 1.9 million ad-
ditional accounts, as described in 3.8. Because 
this data was incomplete, it proved difficult to 
craft a firm estimate, but we believe a minimum 
of 16,000 additional supporters are contained in 
that set. With caveats, we estimate a hard ceiling 
for ISIS supporters in the vicinity of 90,000 ac-
counts; we could not establish a definitive upper 
limit. Based on anecdotal observation, we suspect 
the true number does not approach this level; 
however the metrics described in section 3.8 al-
low for this possibility. 
All data in this paper pertains to specific ranges of 
time when the data was collected, from October 
4 through November 27, 2014, with some seed 
data retrieved in September 2014. Thousands of 
accounts were suspended and created throughout 
the period of data collection. Therefore this esti-
mate does not reflect the exact user base of ISIS at 
any specific moment, but rather reflects activity on 
a rolling basis. The user base at any given moment 
was likely smaller than the total estimate of 46,000. 
The only way to capture a snapshot over a more 
condensed time frame would involve either directly 
accessing data, with permission, from within Twit-
ter’s own systems, or violating Twitter’s terms of 
service regarding the speed of access of data. These 
options were respectively unavailable and undesir-
able. 
When coding samples, we adopted a very conserva-
tive regimen, detailed below, which likely under-
estimates the amount of support for ISIS in the 
dataset by emphasizing overt support and exclud-
ing ambiguous classes of accounts. There are three 
ambiguous classes of account that should be con-
sidered when evaluating these results: 
•	Covert supporters of ISIS: Users who took me-
dium to strong steps to conceal their support due 
to fear of prosecution or suspension by Twitter. 
Users who took only casual steps to disguise their 
support were generally detectable. 
•	Pro-ISIS intelligence operatives: Some users 
who follow accounts related to the enemies of 
ISIS, such as rival jihadists, would be coded as 
non-supporters under the conservative criteria 
we employed.
•	Anti-ISIS intelligence operatives: These are ac-
counts created to appear as ISIS supporters in 
order to allow ISIS’s enemies to monitor its ac-
tivities, which would be coded as supporters (if 
done effectively). 
After reviewing hundreds of accounts in the set—
with a focus on those that appeared ambiguous—
we believe a significant number of accounts in 
the Demographics Dataset fall into the first two 
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•	Accounts primarily controlled by bots or apps 
(see sections 1.13 and 3.3)
This first round of eliminations left us with 
43,538 accounts. We identified a set of 20,000 
accounts, of which we estimate more than 93 
percent are ISIS supporters, with a margin of er-
ror of about +/- 2.54 percent. This set of 20,000 
accounts, the “Demographics Dataset,” was used 
to produce the descriptive analysis in this sec-
tion, except where explicitly noted. 
categories. Nevertheless, most were coded as non-
supporters. We did not develop a methodology to 
evaluate the third category, and the number of po-
tentially relevant users remains unknown. 
Several variations of our identification methodol-
ogy produced extremely similar results in the top 
20,000 accounts, adding to our confidence in the 
integrity of the sample. The final metric was more 
effective at lower ranges as well. 
The number of supporters has certainly changed 
since the data was collected; we provide data on 
more recent changes in section 2.5.4. 
1.2 
The Demographics Dataset
After determining the estimated total number of 
ISIS-supporting accounts, we sought to describe a 
representative sample as completely as possible. 
Because the quantity of data analyzed was too large 
to allow for an individual review of every single ac-
count, we had to sort ISIS supporters from non-
supporters among accounts for which we had ro-
bust data. 
Non-supporter accounts in the data collected in-
cluded enemies of ISIS, non-ISIS jihadis, people 
tracking the organization’s activities (such as jour-
nalists and researchers), and accounts for online 
services used by ISIS supporters, such as @YouTube 
or @Twitter. 
Using metrics described in section 3.6, we sorted 
the 49,379 accounts for which we collected full 
data according to the probability that an account 
belonged to an overt ISIS supporter. We evaluated 
the performance of the metrics by coding samples 
from the dataset using a conservative methodology 
for identifying visible supporters. We also weeded 
5,841 accounts according to the following criteria: 
•	Suspended mid-collection, 90 accounts (see sec-
tion 2.5.1)
•	Accounts with more than 50,000 followers (see 
section 2.2)
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1.3 
Data Snapshot
Best estimate of total number of overt ISIS supporter accounts on 
Twitter: 46,000 
Maximum estimate of ISIS supporter accounts on Twitter: 90,000
Number of accounts analyzed for demographics information: 20,000 
Estimated percentage of overt ISIS supporters in demographics data-
set: 93.2 percent (+/- 2.54 percent)
Period over which data was collected: October 4 through November 
27, 2014, with some seed data collected in late September 2014
Top Locations of Accounts: “Islamic State,” Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
Most common year accounts were created: 2014
Most common month accounts were created: September 2014
Number of accounts detected using bots and deceptive spam tactics: 
6,216 using bot or spam technology for some tweets; 3,301 ac-
counts were excluded from the Demographics Dataset for pri-
marily sending bot or spam content
Average number of tweets per day per user: 7.3 over lifetime of ac-
count, 15.5 over last 200 tweets by user 
Average number of tweets per user (Over lifetime of the Account): 2,219
Average number of followers: 1,004
Smartphone usage: 69 percent Android, 30 percent iPhone, 
1 percent Blackberry
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1.4 
Location
Figure 1: Likely ISIS supporters who sent at least one tweet out of their last 200 with location metadata enabled  
in the fall of 2014. Additionally, two users were located in Brazil, and one each in Indonesia and Australia.
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1. Kalev Leetaru, Shaowen Wang, Guofeng Cao, Anand Padmanabhan, and Eric Shook, “Mapping the global Twit-
ter heartbeat: The geography of Twitter,” First Monday, Vol. 18, No. 5–6, May 2013, http://firstmonday.org/article/
view/4366/3654; Jalal Mahmud, Jeffrey Nichols, and Clemens Drews, “ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and 
Technology (TIST),” Special Section on Urban Computing archive, Volume 5 Issue 3, September 2014, http://arxiv.org/
ftp/arxiv/papers/1403/1403.2345.pdf. 
One of the most immediately interesting and im-
portant questions about ISIS’s online supporter 
base is where users are located. 
Using open source means, the only totally reliable 
method of geo-locating users is to obtain coordi-
nates provided when a user has enabled the loca-
tion feature on his or her smartphone (usually re-
solving to a GPS signal or a cell phone tower). We 
analyzed only the most recent coordinate provided 
by each user. 
Unsurprisingly, very few users in the dataset opted 
to enable coordinates; the number who did was sur-
prisingly high given the operational security impli-
cations. Confirmed ISIS supporters used location 
services less frequently than non ISIS-supporting, 
typical users, but not dramatically less. 
Out of the 20,000 users in the Demographics Da-
taset, 292 had enabled location on at least one tweet 
out of their last 200, or 1.5 percent. By way of com-
parison, a 2013 study of Twitter activity found that 
on a typical day in 2012, 2.02 percent of all users 
had location data enabled, a figure that has steadily 
increased over time.1 For the entire Census Dataset 
of 43,538 accounts, the figure was 3 percent. 
The largest cluster of location-enabled accounts 
(28 percent) was found in Iraq and Syria, mostly in 
areas either controlled or contested by ISIS. More 
than twice as many users reported coordinates in 
Syria than Iraq. The next most common location 
was Saudi Arabia, with 27 percent. After Syria, 
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, no single country repre-
sented more than 6 percent of the total. 
None of the location-enabled users were based in 
the United States; Western countries showed only 
single-digit totals (e.g., three accounts in France; 
two in Brazil; on in the United Kingdom; one in 
Australia; one in Belgium). 
In January 2015, a user presenting himself as an 
ISIS supporter was observed using a detectable app 
to create tweets associated with falsified GPS coor-
dinates for Mosul. While we cannot rule out the 
possibility of such tactics within the accounts ex-
amined in this paper, we did not observe evidence 
of their widespread use. 
ISIS documents circulated on paper in Iraq, and 
later posted to social media, indicated that the or-
ganization’s leadership was deeply concerned about 
the use of smartphone GPS location by its support-
ers and members on the ground. 
In mid-December 2014, ISIS ordered members 
to disable GPS on their mobile devices within one 
month, warning that violators would have their 
phones confiscated and destroyed. In early January, 
we collected a fresh sample of tweets from a similar 
group of users which suggested this guidance had 
thus far been widely disregarded. 
Because so few users (statistically speaking) had 
enabled location, we also analyzed location using 
a number of different data points provided by ac-
counts. These locations reflect information the us-
ers chose to share, and may be deliberately mislead-
ing (in some cases demonstrably so). There were 
other complications as well, detailed below. 
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Our efforts to infer location using a combination 
of these factors were complicated by the erratic pat-
terns of data entry in the fields by users, as well as 
the various languages in the data set. In all permu-
tations of the analysis, locations of Iraq, Syria, and 
“Islamic State” were dominant. 
Since locations are free-form text fields, we used a 
third-party algorithm to resolve entries to the coun-
try level. The list of locations that resolved to the 
United States was extremely noisy, including entries 
such as “Earth,” “everywhere,” “in the kitchen mak-
ing a sandwich,” and “wherever the plane’s taking 
me.” However, some American cities were speci-
fied, primarily New York and Washington, D.C. 
Most locations could not be verified, and none of 
the location-enabled users were based in the United 
States. We are reasonably certain some ISIS support-
ers deceptively listed locations in the United States in 
order to create the appearance of a homeland threat.
Nevertheless, the location field was the only 
method that produced a confidence-inspiring re-
In addition to GPS coordinates, there are a number 
of ways to infer a user’s location based on infor-
mation the user has provided. Each of these comes 
with a tradeoff, usually in the form of more data 
versus higher quality data. 
Aside from location-enabled data and the content 
of tweets—deemed too noisy to be reliable—users 
can provide information about their location in the 
following formats: 
•	The “location” field on their Twitter profile. Users 
can enter several words in the field with no re-
striction on content; for example, they can offer 
jokes or non-relevant information. 
•	Time zone: Users can select whatever time zone 
they want. Because the selected time zone influ-
ences the time of tweets appear on a user’s time-
line, there is motivation to enter it correctly, al-
though many users do not. 
•	 The “Bio” field in their Twitter profile, where users 
can write 160 characters of descriptive text on what-
ever subject they like, usually about themselves.
1.4.1 
Inferred Location
Figure 2: Top locations claimed by users; users listing “Islamic State” were distributed between Syria and Iraq at a 
ratio equivalent to the distribution seen in location-enabled tweets. 
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enabled findings. Another 866 accounts claimed 
Saudi Arabia as a location. 
With the exception of the United States, the top 20 
countries correlated to regions where ISIS enjoys 
substantial support, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, 
Yemen, and Gaza.2 
note that the name of the city listed in a time zone 
may not reflect the actual location of the user, even 
if the user is in that time zone. 
Location-enabled users entered both time zones 
and locations that did not match their actual loca-
tions. For instance, within the Census Dataset of 
more than 43,000, only 20 users provided all of 
the following: a claimed location, a time zone, and 
a location-enabled coordinate. All 20 of those us-
ers misrepresented their claimed location relative to 
the location provided by GPS. 
Considerably more users designated their loca-
tion as being in the Baghdad time zone than 
specified Baghdad as their actual time zone. It is 
possible that users outside that region are more 
willing to disclose their time zone; however, the 
sult. Accounts that provided information in the 
location field resolved to 107 countries, with 960 
accounts concentrated in Iraq and Syria. Users 
who listed “Islamic State” as their location were 
considered to be in either Syria or Iraq, and we 
assigned them to one or the other following the 
two-to-one distribution noted in the location-
Within the Demographics Dataset, 6,546 users 
opted to specify a time zone. The most frequently 
listed were Baghdad, 31 percent; Kyiv, 12 percent; 
Athens, 10 percent; and Riyadh, 5 percent. As 
previously noted, a notable number of users listed 
Arizona and Hawaii as their time zone; combined, 
these accounted for 6.3 percent. 
Athens and Kyiv share a time zone adjacent to the 
Baghdad time zone and encompasses portions of 
Turkey and Syria, including parts of Syria where ISIS 
maintains a heavy presence, such as in the group’s de 
facto capital in Raqqa, Syria. Since Twitter does not 
offer a time zone selection that names a Syrian city, 
these entries likely reflect users in those locations.
There was a significant disparity between the stated 
locations and time zones of users. It is important to 
Figure 3: Time zones selected by users
2. Aaron Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Model,” Washington Post, 28 January 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mon-
key-cage/wp/2015/01/28/the-islamic-states-model/.
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3. For example, the site’s design flips to the right or left depending on whether a user selects Arabic or English.
4. “Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 January 2015, www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/
infographics/26584940.html. 
5. Ashwin Shehagiri, “The Languages of Twitter Users,” New York Times, 9 March 2014, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/03/09/the-languages-of-twitter-users/?_r=0.
English as their preferred language, compared 
to 3 percent who selected Arabic. The trend of 
Twitter adoption by Arabic users from 2011 to 
2013 suggests this number probably increased 
sharply in 2014.5 
As far as content, many users tweeted in more than 
one language, sometimes as part of ISIS social media 
strategies to direct messages at external target audi-
ences, such as when it publicizes the beheadings of 
Western hostages. Tweets also frequently featured a 
mix of languages, such as English hashtags attached 
to Arabic content.
primary factor was likely the large number of 
users who listed Islamic State as their location, 
which may be meant as a show of support rather 
than a disclosure. 
The vast majority of users listing Baghdad as their 
time zone entered a location that was metaphori-
cal or unclear; 42 percent stated they were either 
in Iraq or Syria, with many listing their location 
simply as the Islamic State. 
1.5 
Languages
Twitter offers data on what language a user se-
lected when completing his or her profile informa-
tion. The choice of language is important to the 
process of navigating the website—for example to 
read menus and settings—and also dictates where 
such features will appear on the page.3 User lan-
guage selection does not necessarily correlate to the 
language used in tweets. Multilingual users might 
choose to navigate the site in a second language, if 
they are adequately proficient. 
Language data was available for more than 18,000 
members of the Demographics Dataset, excluding 
some accounts which were suspended or otherwise 
changed status before data could be collected. 
Among those users, 73 percent selected Arabic, 
18 percent selected English, and 6 percent select-
ed French, a finding that tracks to some extent 
with the distribution of Western foreign fight-
ers,4 with an overemphasis on English that also 
likely reflects ISIS’s target audience in the United 
States for inciting and harassing propaganda. No 
other language comprised more than 1 percent 
of the total. 
In a 2013 study of typical Twitter users who se-
lected a language preference, 51 percent chose 
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6. Ellie Hall, “Inside The Chilling Online World Of The Women Of ISIS,” BuzzFeed, 11 September 2014, http://www.buzzfeed.
com/ellievhall/inside-the-online-world-of-the-women-of-isis#.tj0p38MZL.
1.6 
Display Names
Twitter users identify themselves in two primary ways. 
The first is through the selection of a user handle 
(“@johndoe”), and the second is through the selection 
of a display name on the profile page, such as “John 
Doe,” although the display name can consist of any 
words or symbols up to 20 characters in length.
Despite a wide range of individual variation, some 
trends in the selection of display names were detected. 
The only powerful trend involved identification with 
the Islamic State in a broad sense using terms such as 
Dawla (Arabic for “state,” used as a shortened name 
for “Islamic State”), baqiyah (an ISIS slogan), Shami 
(Arabic for Syrian) and references to the caliphate. 
These terms were overwhelmingly more frequent than 
virtually any other words used in display names. 
Similar to location information, user display names 
in the Demographics Dataset were subject to misdi-
rection and confusion. However, some markers were 
commonly used to highlight foreign fighters: muhajir, 
“immigrant”, and ghuraba’, “strangers.” One of those 
two words appeared in a total of 500 user profiles. 
References to nationalities suggested an even larger 
number of foreign fighters in the set. 
Within the top 20,000 users, 239 accounts were 
observed to use the Arabic words umm (mother) 
or bint (girl or daughter) in their handles or display 
names to indicate that they were female. In con-
trast, 4,536 users used the Arabic word abu in their 
handles or display names, claiming a male identity. 
Other gender indicators were used in names, but 
the complexity of navigating multiple languages 
and naming conventions to produce a credible re-
sult with directly comparable terms for men and 
women exceeded the time available for this study. 
However, a third-party tool relying on opaque cri-
teria estimated approximately seven men for every 
one woman in the network. Additional research 
would provide better insight into this question. 
Earlier in 2014, nearly 500 accounts identifying 
themselves as umm or bint were detected during an 
unpublished research experiment by J.M. Berger, 
which specifically sought to identify female sup-
porters of ISIS. In this study, male and female 
social networks were observed to be segregated to 
some extent, often at the explicit urging of both 
male and female ISIS supporters, which may have 
also influenced the results.6
Figure 4: Most common Arabic words entered by users in the “display name” field
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1.7 
Date of Account Creation
As seen in figures 5 and 6, an extremely large 
number (23 percent) of ISIS-supporting accounts 
were created in 2014; accounts showed the most 
activity in September of that year. Collection of 
user information ended in mid-October (other 
data took longer to collect); the actual total for 
that month would presumably have been higher 
had collection continued. (A differently derived 
comparison figure for October can be seen in 
section 2.5.4.)
Figure 5: Date of account creation, by year 
Figure 6: Accounts created in 2014, by month 
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7. Ben Popper, “Twitter’s user growth has stalled, but its business keeps improving,” The Verge, 5 February 2015,  
http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/5/7987501/twitter-q4-2014-earnings. 
Not coincidentally, September 2014 corresponds 
with the time frame during which Twitter began 
to aggressively suspend ISIS supporters for tweet-
ing graphic images and videos of the beheadings of 
Western hostages. 
We believe many—perhaps most—of these ac-
counts were created in response to the suspensions, 
either to replace accounts that had been taken 
down, or as backup accounts to hedge against fu-
ture suspensions and other steps to offset ISIS’s 
Twitter influence. A potentially substantial number 
of users may have created and recreated multiple 
accounts during the September 2014 time frame, 
which were subsequently suspended. 
Only 1.3 percent of all accounts were created 
prior to December 31, 2010. Almost 60 percent 
were created in 2014. This suggests that most 
ISIS supporters are relatively new to Twitter, or 
that they created new accounts to reflect a change 
of interest. 
It is important to account for Twitter’s overall 
growth in the past several years; however, the 
growth in ISIS supporting accounts outstripped 
that of the overall Twitter user population. Twit-
ter’s user base grew by approximately 30 percent 
in 2013, while ISIS’s user base nearly doubled. 
The Twitter user base grew 20 percent in 2014;7 
the number of ISIS supporters on Twitter nearly 
tripled during the same period (within the lim-
its of the sample). This is reflective of strong 
growth, but also reflects anecdotal observations 
of increased adoption of social media by jihadist 
extremists starting in 2013. 
The growth in ISIS’s online support base also 
broadly correlates with its growth on the ground 
in Iraq and Syria, and the course of its rift with 
and ultimate separation from al-Qa’ida. Some 
al-Qa’ida-supporting Twitter users may have cre-
ated new accounts after this split to demonstrate 
their allegiance to ISIS. 
Year 
Created
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Number  
of Accounts
2
92
182
1064
2380
4378
11902
At least some of the growth in the number of ISIS 
supporters is organic, although the spikes in the 
data clearly reflect considerations related to the 
suspension of accounts in September and Octo-
ber 2014. Arguably, the spike could have exagger-
ated the total estimate of supporters by as much 
as 20 percent. We conclude that at least some of 
the churn effect of accounts being created and de-
stroyed canceled itself out. 
The question of users who simultaneously maintain 
multiple accounts is also relevant, since some users 
create duplicate and backup accounts in response 
to being suspended. Such accounts were observed 
anecdotally, and most backup accounts appeared 
to remain relatively inactive until their predecessor 
accounts were suspended. Since suspensions are al-
most always based on the content of tweets, rather 
than other network characteristics, there is a strong 
practical argument against duplicating content in a 
backup account created for the express purpose of 
evading suspension. 
Nevertheless, some users were observed using 
Twitter client apps that include the function 
(such as Hootsuite and Tweetdeck). Clear ex-
amples of this behavior were relatively rare (con-
siderably fewer than 300 accounts in the initial, 
unsorted Census Dataset of more than 49,000 
accounts), and users consistently employing this 
technique were almost entirely excluded from 
the Demographics Dataset consistent with the 
rules for bots and apps (see section 3.3).
Percentage 
of total
0.01%
0.46%
0.91%
5.32%
11.90%
21.89%
59.51%
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1.8 
Date of Last Recorded Tweet
Figure 7: Date of last tweet, excluding the 83 percent of accounts that tweeted during the collection period 
Collection of tweets took place from October 
through November 2014. The majority of tweets 
were collected in October, during which more than 
83 percent of the accounts tweeted. Of the remain-
ing accounts, 99.2 percent tweeted in 2014. That 
left only a fraction of 1 percent that had been inac-
tive since 2013 or earlier, with the vast majority of 
those having tweeted in 2013. Given that ISIS, in 
its current incarnation, only came into existence in 
2013, this is a logical finding. 
The metrics that were used to identify ISIS sup-
porters weight certain types of activity and may 
have influenced this data (section Sorting Metrics). 
Additionally, the criteria for seed accounts (section 
Starting Point) also influenced the set to favor ac-
counts that were more active. 
Other factors were weighted to avoid detecting 
only users with visible tweets, and we believe this 
data accurately points toward a high level of activity 
among ISIS supporters. Only 44 percent of all ex-
isting Twitter accounts display even a single visible 
tweet,8 so by virtually any measure, ISIS-support-
ing Twitter users are far more active than ordinary 
users. A similarly derived analysis of 400 Al-Qa’ida 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supporters, for 
instance, found that 34 percent had been silent 
since the start of 2014.9
A number of the accounts which had not tweeted 
since 2012 had clearly been active more recently, 
since some of them were branded with ISIS’s name 
established after 2013. In some cases, we discov-
ered in later investigation that such accounts were 
actively tweeting, suggesting that some users within 
this small subset deleted their tweets periodically 
(consistent with previous observations of this activ-
ity). Others simply did not tweet publicly; 30 per-
cent of the 1,264 accounts for which no tweet date 
was collected were marked private. The remainder 
had no tweets available for analysis at the time of 
collection for whatever reason. 
8. Yoree Koh, “Report: 44% of Twitter Accounts Have Never Sent a Tweet,” Wall Street Journal, 11 April 2014, http://blogs.wsj.
com/digits/2014/04/11/new-data-quantifies-dearth-of-tweeters-on-twitter/.
9. Analysis generated in January 2015 using same techniques as in this study. 
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1.9 
Avatars
ISIS supporters use a wide variety of images as iden-
tity markers on Twitter. A non-exhaustive review 
of Twitter profile pictures within the dataset shows 
that these images are most prolific among users 
who have 150 to 1000 followers. Smaller accounts 
often use the default Twitter “egg,” while larger 
accounts sometimes employ imagery unrelated to 
ISIS—perhaps meant to hedge against suspension 
by Twitter. Within the Demographics Dataset, 6.5 
percent of accounts used the default profile picture. 
Images were reviewed manually rather than pro-
grammatically, although such an approach could be 
the basis of future research. Anecdotally, the most 
common profile picture was easily the iconic black 
and white flag used by ISIS in its official documents 
and propaganda, and liberally displayed in territo-
ries ISIS controls. The next most commonly-used 
imagery involved variations on pictures of ISIS’s 
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Al-Qa’ida founder Osama bin Laden and al-
Qa’ida in Iraq founder Abu Musab al Zarqawi 
were also well-represented, along with promi-
nent ISIS members such as “Jihadi John.” Us-
ers also displayed figures less known to outsiders, 
such as Abu Abed Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, who 
was killed while playing a key role in ISIS’s June 
2014 attack on Mosul, Iraq. 
Users can also select a background picture to 
run in a banner size across the top of their Twit-
ter profile page. These were less consistent than 
profile pictures. Images often included fanciful 
depictions of the Islamic State, such as fighters 
on horseback carrying ISIS’s flag, airliners and 
buildings festooned with the flag, or in one case, 
a large sailing ship with the flag as its main sail. 
Other popular background images included 
scenes from ISIS video productions. 
Figure 8: Typical Twitter profile pictures used by ISIS supporters include variations on the flag used by ISIS, im-
ages of al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, and prominent ISIS members and leaders including “Jihadi John” and 
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. 
20 |  Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings
10. J.M. Berger, “Resistible Force Meets Movable Object,” Intelwire, 2 October 2014, http://news.intelwire.com/2014/10/resist-
able-force-meets-movable-object.html. 
1.10 
Top Hashtags
We collected each user’s 200 most recent tweets. A 
total of 5,384,892 tweets were analyzed, containing 
100,767 unique hashtags used a total of 1,465,749 
times, which is an average of once every 3.7 tweets. 
At least 151,617 hashtags that included one of 
four most-common variations on the spelling of 
“Islamic State” in Arabic were detected (all of the 
variations could not be fully accounted for), repre-
senting 2.8 percent of all tweets. 
No other hashtags even came close to that 
rate of usage. The next most common hashtag was 
the Arabic word for “urgent,” which was liberally 
appended to news out of Syria and Iraq; this ap-
peared in 24,275 tweets, or less than 0.5 percent 
of all tweets. The word “Syria” in both Arabic and 
English was slightly lower, with 23,769 tweets. 
A breakdown of the top 100 hashtags found that 
26 percent consisted of the “Islamic State” hashtag 
in its four most common variations. “Urgent” and 
Syria represented about 4 percent each. 
In fourth place—representing 3 percent of the top 100 
but only 1.2 percent of all hashtags—was “Da’ish,” the 
Arabic acronym for ISIS that is generally viewed as 
a derogatory term. The hashtag’s presence reflected 
negative content about ISIS from non-responsive 
accounts in the dataset, retweets of content critical 
of ISIS that supporters wished to respond to, and a 
relatively small but notable group of users using the 
hashtag to send pro-ISIS messages to ISIS critics, or 
to reclaim the term in a positive light. 
Within the top 100 hashtags, we categorized all 
general references to ISIS or the caliphate, all refer-
ences to Syria and all references to Da’ish, as well 
as all hashtags pertaining to the suspension of ISIS-
supporting accounts and the announcement of re-
placement accounts. 
ISIS references represented 40 percent of the top 
100 hashtags. Hashtags used in reference to Twitter 
suspensions were second, with 9 percent. 
This figure accords with previous research by 
J.M. Berger based an analysis of approximately 
3,000 tweets sent from September 29 to October 
1 of 2014, which found that at least 8 percent of 
ISIS tweets sent during that period pertained to 
account suspensions.10 
Figure 9: Number of tweets containing a hashtag, consolidated by theme from among the top 100 hashtags
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1.11 
Top Links 
Tracking the external content (such as links to pro-
paganda) sent by ISIS Twitter accounts forms an 
obviously important function. However, we could 
not satisfactorily resolve this during the course of 
this study, due to a number of complications. We 
therefore recommend further research on the topic. 
The calculation of most-linked content was com-
plicated by a number of factors, most importantly 
Twitter’s URL shortening practices and the removal 
of ISIS content by third-party Internet service pro-
viders such as YouTube. 
Twitter employs URL-shortening to allow users to 
send links to content without exceeding the 140-char-
acter limit for a tweet. When a full-length URL (such 
as www.youtube.com/watch?v=h77URBgDRlc&feat
ure=youtu.be) is entered by the user, it is shortened to 
take up fewer characters (such as youtu.be/h77UR-
BgDRlc). Twitter keeps track of shortened URLs by 
shortening them further for internal use, rendering 
them all under the domain t.co (t.co/KcEfbPiWgc).
We detected 2,149,327 shortened URLs in the 
set of 5,384,892 tweets, or one URL for every 2.5 
tweets. There were more than 1.5 million unique 
shortened URLs, but since multiple shortened 
URLs can point to the same target URL, we 
are certain that fewer unique web pages were 
linked. We were unable to resolve this question 
in more detail. 
Expanding these URLs after the fact was prob-
lematic. Some users shortened a URL before 
entering it into Twitter, so expanding the t.co 
URL only points to another shortened URL. 
If Twitter deems content to be a violation of 
its terms of service, the t.co link will simply 
stop functioning. 
Of the unique t.co URLs, 689 were tweeted more 
than 100 times, with the first-ranked URL being 
tweeted only 846 times. Many of the URLs were 
malformed, meaning the t.co URL could not be 
extracted accurately from the text. We attempted 
to expand the top 20 unique URLs to discover the 
content they pointed to, with the following results 
shown in the table below:
Shortened URL
http://t.co/wdrKsuc5fd
http://t.co/Fh1Y73OyEX
Malformed URL
Malformed URL
http://t.co/H6uUirXBD9
Malformed URL
http://t.co/kPcWorCHG8
http://t.co/m2azV15Yyu
http://t.co/
http://t.co/mFywYHZp
http://t.co/PygkTd7N2n
Malformed URL
http://t.co/QsnbwSlLwE
http://t.co/pbKMmJEnTH
Malformed URL
Malformed URL
http://t.co/Pr6pl1Gs1Z
Malformed URL
Malformed URL
Malformed URL
Expanded URL
http://retweetcom.com/ret
http://twitter.com/by3_S/status/519152478433345536/photo/1 
Expansion failed
Expansion failed
http://retweetcom.com/ret
Expansion failed
http://twitter.com/ilyass_4/status/519149486795272192/photo/1 
http://twitter.com/Fighter_Otaibi/status/521357691491336192/photo/1
Content removed due to personal identification
Expansion failed
http://rt10.a77mad.com
Expansion failed
http://topretweet.com/
http://twitter.com/ilyass_4/status/519149486795272192/photo/1 
Expansion failed
Expansion failed
http://cutt.us/fnzQF
Expansion failed
Expansion failed
Expansion failed
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Significantly, the first- and fifth-ranked URLs for 
which we could resolve a target page pointed to a 
single page that could not be loaded at the time of 
writing, on a domain that could also not be loaded. 
The domain’s name, Retweetcom.com, obviously 
suggests it is a Twitter app for manufacturing arti-
ficially inflated retweets, consistent with manipula-
tive tactics observed to be used by ISIS supporters on 
social media, and nearly 3,000 tweets in the dataset 
were attributed to the site’s Twitter app. The expand-
ed URLs ranked 11th and 13th pointed to similar 
spam-like services. 
One t.co URL pointed to another URL shorten-
ing services (cutt.us), which led to yet another URL 
shortening services that required a login. 
Of the remaining URLs, four pointed to tweets con-
taining photos. Three of the accounts linked had 
been suspended; the fourth pertained to an ill child 
in Syria, and not ISIS. The picture was no longer 
available, although the text of the tweet remained; it 
had been retweeted 46,000 times. Because the indi-
vidual was not linked to ISIS and provided person-
ally identifying information on his account, we have 
removed the URL of the linked tweet.
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Twitter sporadically suspended ISIS’s primary of-
ficial account throughout 2014, before taking a 
more aggressive stand starting in summer 2014, 
when it increasingly suspended most official ac-
counts including media outlets, regional hubs, 
and well-known members. ISIS briefly experi-
mented with transferring its official accounts to 
other social media services, where it was also met 
with repeated suspensions. 
Although ISIS’s public, official accounts have more 
or less been eliminated, it has adopted coping 
mechanisms to maintain control over information 
flow on Twitter. 
Specifically, its official social media operatives have 
established small accounts, some of which fly under 
the radar, while others are periodically suspended 
and regenerated. These users are responsible for 
uploading ISIS content to file-sharing and video 
web sites, and then publishing links to the content. 
Other users (known as the mujtahidun, and dis-
cussed further in section 2.1) then disseminate the 
links more widely.
As of January 2015, ISIS had reconstituted its 
regional accounts with strong privacy settings, 
allowing only a small group of known ISIS sup-
porters to follow the accounts and read their 
tweets. The content of the tweets—primarily 
news releases, videos and photos from ISIS’s vari-
ous provinces—are then disseminated by a num-
ber of other smaller accounts using hashtags. Af-
ter the initial dissemination, the content is more 
widely distributed, but at significantly reduced 
levels from early 2014. 
As of December 28, 2014, we had detected 79 such 
“official” accounts, mostly through specific investi-
gation and manual search, rather than via the Cen-
Figure 10: Network relationships among “official” ISIS accounts as of January 3, 2014
1.12 
“Official” Accounts
24 |  Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings
lifetime, and 11.8 times per day within each ac-
count’s last 200 tweets. 
The private accounts averaged 150 followers each, 
and many used the default Twitter “egg” profile 
picture in order to maintain a lower profile. The 
regional accounts were mostly marked private, al-
though some were seen to switch to public tweets 
at times, and they were connected to other private 
accounts that appear to be an essential part of the 
functioning of the semi-official account network. 
sends out the content. These services also typi-
cally rely on bots and apps to do their work. 
Some apps, such as Hootsuite and Tweetbot, are 
simply Twitter clients that allow users to tweet and 
follow others, and may not include manipulative 
features. We eliminated the most popular clients 
from the list and focused on non-client apps. 
Some apps are apparently devotional in nature, 
tweeting prayers, religious aphorisms, and content 
sus data collection process; certain high-scoring ac-
counts from the Census Dataset were added to the 
list after examination. Of the 79 accounts, 24 had 
designated their tweets and follower lists as private. 
We were nevertheless able to gather some informa-
tion through various analytical approaches. 
The public accounts had an average of about 6,437 
followers each, although fresh suspensions reduced 
that number within just a few days. These accounts 
tweeted an average of 11 times per day over their 
ISIS supporters use a wide variety of bots and apps 
for many different purposes. 
Bots and apps are small pieces of computer soft-
ware or third-party services designed to promote 
content from a Twitter account automatically, 
without a human being manually sending tweets. 
A wide variety of bot and app techniques were 
observed in the collected data. Spam services sell 
tweets and retweets of selected content. A user 
purchases tweets from the seller, then the seller 
1.13
Bots and Apps
Figure 11: Top non-client apps used to send tweets by members of the Demographics Dataset, by number 
of tweets sent
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11. J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic, 16 June 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/.
from the Quran, although they may also serve as 
identity markers or fulfill some kind of signal-
ing function. These apps, such as knzmuslim and 
du3a, can produce staggering numbers of tweets 
per day. Knzmuslim was clocked at more than one 
million tweets per day, and around 1,000 tweets 
per minute, at one point in early January. The 
content they post does not overtly pertain to ISIS. 
In addition to their wide popularity both within 
and outside of ISIS circles, these apps introduce 
noise into social networks and their use may be 
intended to impede analysis. 
Some apps, such as BufferApp, are used to schedule 
tweets to be sent at a particular time, and do not 
necessarily denote manipulative behavior. A num-
ber of similar commercial social media marketing 
tools, including some used by ordinary businesses 
and brands, were detected. 
Other apps are intended to disseminate ISIS pro-
paganda at a pace and volume that enables their 
wider distribution. The most successful of these was 
known as the “Dawn of Good Tidings.” In mid-
2014, thousands of accounts signed up for the app, 
which was endorsed by top ISIS online personali-
ties. At its peak, it sent tens of thousands of tweets 
per day. The app was terminated by Twitter in June 
2014, silencing thousands of ISIS-supporting ac-
counts overnight.11 
In the wake of that setback, ISIS supporters have 
responded by creating a large number of bots in 
small clusters, with each cluster using a differ-
ent service to post tweets of the propaganda and 
hashtags it wishes to promote. If one “family” of 
bots is suspended, there are still many others that 
will continue to tweet. Thousands of such accounts 
were detected in the course of this analysis. Many 
from this new generation of bots were constructed 
using popular third party automation services such 
as IFTT (If This, Then That), which Twitter is un-
likely to shut down since it is much more common-
ly used for innocuous purposes by ordinary users. 
Because a deceptive app can function alongside 
a human operator of a Twitter account (sending 
tweets automatically while still allowing the user to 
tweet normally), we did not filter out all of the apps 
and bots we detected. In some cases, the app did 
not represent the majority of the content tweeted 
by the account. In other cases, apps were deter-
mined to be legitimate Twitter clients, rather than 
manipulation devices. We eliminated some known 
bot and spam providers, as well as accounts whose 
tweets were identical to tweets posted by other us-
ers in large volumes. In some cases, we evaluated 
the percentage of a user’s tweets that were sent by 
the app as opposed to other clients. We also re-
viewed technical signatures related to bot activity. 
In the overall Census Dataset, around 400 non-
client apps were detected to be in use among more 
than 6,000 accounts. Within the 5.4 million De-
mographics Dataset tweets analyzed, hundreds of 
additional bots and apps were also detected operat-
ing at lower volumes, enough to suggest that per-
haps 20 percent or more of all tweets in the set were 
created using bots or apps. 
Any given Twitter account can include tweets from 
both an app and a human user. We eliminated just 
over 3,000 accounts from the Census Dataset for 
very high levels of bot and spam activity, prior to 
creating the Demographics Dataset (section Bot 
and Spam Detection). In early 2015, we checked 
activity within the Demographics Dataset and dis-
covered about 400 accounts that met the criteria 
used to exclude bots in the first collection. These 
accounts had changed their patterns of activity 
since the original collection. 
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1.14 
Smartphones
Each tweet collected specified what type of Twitter cli-
ent was used to send the tweet, meaning whether it was 
sent from the Twitter web site or a smartphone client. 
For each user, we collected the name and download 
link for the client they employed most frequently. We 
broke these down according to whether the download 
link pointed to the Google Play store, the Apple store, 
or Blackberry.com. A number of other mobile clients 
were used, far smaller numbers, such as an app exclu-
sive to Lenovo phones. 
Among users of the three most popular phone 
types, 69 percent had downloaded a Twitter cli-
ent from the Google Play story or Google.com. 
Another 30 percent used a client downloaded 
from the Apple iTunes store, and about 1 percent 
had downloaded a client from Blackberry.com. 
In mid-December, ISIS announced it would ban 
iPhone products within its territory due to se-
curity concerns. In early February, we collected 
data on a set of 10,000 likely ISIS-supporting ac-
counts using a similar methodology to the over-
all study, and found only a 1 percent drop in the 
use of iPhones. 
Figure 12: Smartphone usage among ISIS supporters, according to primary app used for tweeting
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2. 
Social Media Metrics
In addition to information that reflects user pref-
erences and location, the most basic Twitter met-
rics—the number of followers and following, and 
patterns of tweeting—was analyzed to determine 
the profile of a typical ISIS supporter account, and 
understand some characteristics of the overall net-
work and its potential reach.
28 |  Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings
than one tweet per day on average. Only 2.4 per-
cent of accounts tweeted more than 50 times per 
day on average. A typical account tweeted 7.3 times 
per day, for an average daily output of 133,422 
tweets per day from all members. This total output 
figure comes with several caveats. 
These tweet-per-day averages allow for long pe-
riods during which users do not tweet. For ex-
ample, a user could open an account and tweet 
70 times on Monday, then stop tweeting for the 
rest of the week. His average would be 10 tweets 
per day for the week. 
Overall, ISIS supporters were much more active 
than the average Twitter user. In the December 
sample, 35 percent of users had tweeted within 
the 24 hours preceding the collection of data, 
and another 16 percent had tweeted within the 
preceding seven days. Within the year preceding 
collection, 98 percent of users had tweeted at 
least once, considerably higher than the 67 per-
cent of all active Twitter users who had tweeted 
The nature of the process we used to evaluate 
tweets, while important to developing the met-
rics used to evaluate the accounts, limited evalua-
tion of some aspects of a user’s activity (especially 
for prolific users who tweeted at a high pace).
Therefore we evaluated tweeting patterns using 
two sets of data: 
•	Data collected for the study that analyzed 
activity based on the user’s most recent 200 
tweets. This helped us identify users who might 
not tweet every day or week, but who are very 
active when they are online.
•	Data based on more than 18,000 accounts 
active in late December under the same user-
names were identified in the initial collection 
of data. These figures reflected activity over the 
lifetime of the account. 
Over the lifetime of their accounts, about 69 per-
cent of ISIS supporters sent fewer than five tweets 
per day on average, with 40 percent sending less 
Figure 13: Tweets per day, calculated from each user’s 200 most recent tweets
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12. David Murphy, “44 Percent of Twitter Accounts Have Never Tweeted,” PC Magazine, 13 April 2014, http://www.pcmag.com/
article2/0,2817,2456489,00.asp. 
within the previous year. 62 percent of ISIS sup-
porters had tweeted within 30 days of collection, 
compared to just 13 percent of all Twitter users.12 
The lifetime averages, while useful, do not ad-
equately portray user activity patterns. The most 
active accounts are also the most likely to be sus-
pended (as discussed in section 2.5.1). Because 
of this, the December sample omitted some of 
the most active accounts from analysis. Further-
more, some users whose past activity was mea-
sured at a high rate had subsequently deleted all 
their tweets. Both of these factors shaped the late 
December dataset by removing data on the most 
prolific users. 
As discussed elsewhere in this report, ISIS sup-
porters have been observed to tweet repeatedly in 
short bursts in order to widely disseminate im-
portant content. Insight into this activity can be 
found in the original collection, which analyzed 
the most recent 200 tweets from each account 
and calculated tweets per day based on the time 
of the earliest collected tweet and the latest col-
lected tweet. 
This approach allowed us to detect users who 
tweeted in prolonged bursts, even if they later 
went silent for a period of time. Since only 200 
tweets were collected for each user, the maximum 
value recorded in the dataset was 200 tweets per 
day, even though some users were observed to 
tweet more on specific days. 
An overwhelming majority of users (92 percent) 
tweeted less than 50 times per day, including 500 
accounts whose tweets were marked private and 
for whom no tweets were collected. However, 
1,575 users tweeted more than 50 times per day 
on average, with 545 tweeting more than 150 
times per day. 
These prolific users—referred to in ISIS social 
media strategy documents as the mujtahidun (in-
dustrious ones)—form the highly engaged core 
of ISIS’s social media machine. These users may 
not tweet every day, but when they do, they tweet 
a lot of content in a very short amount of time. 
This activity, more than any other, drives the suc-
cess of ISIS’s efforts to promulgate its message on 
social media. Short, prolonged bursts of activity 
cause hashtags to trend, resulting in third-party 
aggregation and insertion of tweeted content 
into search results. Prior to the start of Twitter’s 
aggressive account suspensions, highly organized 
activity among the mujtahidun—who at one 
point we may have numbered as many as 3,000, 
including bots—allowed ISIS to dominate cer-
tain hashtags and project its material outside of 
its own social network to harass and intimidate 
outsiders, as well as to attract potential recruits 
(this is discussed at more length in section 4). 
Within the entire Demographics Dataset, the aver-
age user tweeted 15.6 times per day when measured 
by their most recent 200 tweets, twice as high as the 
figure calculated over the lifetime of the accounts. 
Because of the 200-tweet cap on data, this estimate 
is certainly lower than the reality. 
Since this figure reflects the most recent tweets 
of each user, it is capped at 200 tweets per day, is 
not delimited by date, and it cannot be used to 
extrapolate total daily volume; it does, however, 
clearly indicate that when users are online, they 
are extremely active. 
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2.2
Number of Followers
Follower counts demonstrate how limited the reach 
of the ISIS social network truly is, but also how it 
outperforms the averages. 
A large majority of ISIS supporters on Twit-
ter—73 percent—had fewer than 500 followers 
each. Only 4 percent had more than 5,000 fol-
lowers. While these figures are very low for on-
line influencers such as celebrities or mainstream 
politicians—who can have follower counts in 
the millions—they are very high relative to the 
average user. 
The mean number of followers among ISIS sup-
porters was 1,004, relative to 208 for the average 
Twitter user. The median was 177 followers, com-
pared to 61 for the average active Twitter user, 
which put the typical user in the 80th percentile or 
higher when compared to all Twitter users.13 ISIS 
supporters outperformed typical users across the 
board (see figure 15), often by multiples. 
13. Jon Bruner, “Tweets Loud and Quiet,” Radar, 18 December 2013, http://radar.oreilly.com/2013/12/tweets-loud-and-quiet.
html; Steven Hughes, “15 Twitter Facts and Figures for 2014 You Need to Know,” JeffBullas.com, 16 April 2014,  
http://www.jeffbullas.com/2014/04/16/15-twitter-facts-and-figures-for-2014-you-need-to-know/. 
The available average user figures date back to 
2013 and includes a great deal of noise, thus 
the comparisons here are somewhat uneven. A 
better comparison might be to users who tweet 
at the same pace on a common topic, a set that 
excludes bots and data that was collected con-
currently. Nonetheless we can confidently state 
that the typical ISIS supporter has more follow-
ers than the typical Twitter user. We believe fu-
ture research on a number of comparable groups 
would be extremely illuminating.
Figure 14: Number of accounts, ranked by the number of followers, in increments of 10, with an upper 
limit of 1,000
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14. “About Twitter Inc.,” Twitter.com, 14 February 2015, https://about.twitter.com/company. 
or Secretary of State John Kerry (400,000). While 
highly active and committed, ISIS supporters are 
an insignificant speck in the overall sea of Twitter’s 
active monthly user base of 284 million.14 
We do not have adequate data to fully assess the im-
pact of previous Twitter suspensions on the user base, 
but it is useful to note that some ISIS supporters and 
official ISIS accounts racked up tens of thousands of 
followers at earlier points in 2013 and 2014 prior to 
being suspended. Suspensions tend to target larger ac-
counts that have more followers, as well as accounts 
that are more active (see section 2.5 for further discus-
sion of this issue). Even in the absence of suspension 
pressure, it had been rare for an ISIS supporter to reg-
ister as many as 100,000 followers. 
Despite the small number of followers that any 
given ISIS account could boast of, ISIS support-
ers are still highly effective at getting their message 
out. They employ a variety of techniques, includ-
ing repeated tweets the same content by the same 
user within a short period of time, and tweeting the 
same content by many users within a short period 
of time, as noted in section 2.1.
Despite its extensive size compared to average Twitter 
users, the ISIS follower base pragmatically represents 
a very small number of people, and its network is very 
internally focused. About 44 percent of all followers 
were other users within the Census Dataset, although 
the rapid changes in the network due to suspensions 
and the creation of new accounts clouded this figure. 
Internal focus was also one of the criteria used to iden-
tify the Demographics Set. While this raised the aver-
age in-network follower count, the criteria was chosen 
precisely because it correlated to ISIS supporters. 
Importantly, no overt ISIS supporter had more 
than 50,000 followers. While some came close, few 
even approached that number. We could have sig-
nificantly increased the accuracy of the metrics by 
cutting off accounts with more than 20,000 follow-
ers, but we believed this would eliminate too many 
responsive accounts. 
Even at their most popular levels, top ISIS influ-
encers command an audience that is fractional 
compared to celebrities or prominent U.S. govern-
ment officials, such as President Obama (54.6 mil-
lion followers), Vice President Joe Biden (735,000), 
Figure 15: Number of followers by percentile, typical Twitter account versus ISIS supporting account
ISIS Versus Typical Users, Followers by Percentile
99.9 99 98 97 96 95 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
24
,9
64
2,
99
1
1,6
75
1,2
11
97
8
81
9
4
58
24
6
15
4
98 61 36 19 9 3
4
21
72
.2
86
19
0
78
.2
7
10
27
4
.2
4
68
14
.2
3
4
89
9.
68
38
24
.8
5
16
79
.4
71
0
4
14
26
7.
4
17
6
12
0
82 53 27
Percentile
Typical User (2013)
ISIS Supporters (2014)
32 |  Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings
15. “An Exhaustive Study of Twitter Users Across the World,” Beevolve, 12 October 2012, http://www.beevolve.com/twit-
ter-statistics/.
16. M.G. Siegler, “Twitter’s Golden Ratio (That No One Likes To Talk About),” Tech Crunch, 26 August 2009, http://tech-
crunch.com/2009/08/26/twitters-golden-ratio-that-no-one-likes-to-talk-about/.
The most followed account in the Demographics 
Dataset was a news source covering ISIS. While it 
did not overtly brand itself as an ISIS-supporting 
outlet, it can be considered as such based on its 
content. This account had only 5,462 followers 
when it first logged into the system, but our data 
showed that it added followers very rapidly (see Ap-
pendix A). At the time of this writing, the account 
had just surpassed 50,000 followers, making it an 
extreme outlier. 
The second most followed account was linked to 
a user believed to be a Palestinian ISIS supporter 
with strong ties to its social media network. The ac-
count had been suspended as of the time of writing. 
2.4 
Follower/Following Ratio
The ratio of an account’s followers to to the number 
of accounts it is following (sometimes referred to as 
“friends”) can act as a barometer for the influence 
of a Twitter account.16 
We suspect the unique qualities of the ISIS data-
set—including manipulative social media practices 
and the campaign of account suspensions—renders 
this measure less useful than it might otherwsise be. 
ISIS strategy documents urge supporters to follow 
large numbers of users selected semi-randomly as a 
hedge against account suspension; there was no indica-
tion this worked as intended, nor that the practice was 
widespread. In other cases, accounts using the names 
of certain popular ISIS supporters were observed to 
accrue massive numbers of followers almost instantly, 
thanks to a combination of bots and third-party spam 
services that offer to sell followers. The most egregious 
of these appeared briefly during the collection period 
and accrued almost 100,000 followers instantly. The 
account was suspended just as quickly, before the col-
lection process captured a picture. Other ISIS users 
noted that the account was fake. 
2.3
Number of Accounts Followed
In terms of data analysis, the number of accounts 
followed is somewhat less useful than the number 
of followers. Both figures are subject to manipula-
tion (for instance, some ISIS accounts have been 
observed to have purchased followers from social 
marketing firms). The number of accounts that a 
user follows, however, is dictated by both person-
al preferences and specific strategies promoted by 
ISIS’s social media team. For example, the team has 
issued documents recommending that users follow 
many accounts followed by popular Arabic preach-
ers in order to muddy outside analysis. 
A commanding majority of users—90.7 percent—
followed less than 1,000 accounts each. Another 
8.4 percent followed 1,000 to 2,000 accounts. Less 
than 1 percent followed more than 2,000 accounts. 
Within the group following fewer than 1,000 users, 
the bias was toward smaller numbers: 81 percent fol-
lowed fewer than 500 accounts, 45 percent followed 
fewer than 200, and 23 percent followed fewer than 
100. Taken together with the follower count analysis, 
this again emphasizes the relatively small and cellu-
lar nature of key ISIS supporter social networks, and 
emphasizes the importance of its coordinated posting 
activity as a component of its messaging success. 
Nevertheless, these figures again compare strong-
ly to overall Twitter usage, in which many ac-
counts sit mostly idle. The average Twitter user 
in 2012 reportedly followed 108 accounts, com-
pared to a mean average of 418 among ISIS sup-
porters (median 257).15
Two thirds of accounts followed by the average user 
were also within the network (meaning the Census 
Dataset). This is to some extent an artifact of the sort-
ing process, which intentionally emphasized users 
who were more focused on the internal network.
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All that said, the ratio of following to followers for 
the average ISIS supporter was 66 percent, indicat-
ing that the typical account followed more than it 
was followed by. Almost half of all ISIS supporter 
accounts (48.5 percent) followed more than twice 
the number of accounts that followed them. Slight-
Analyzing the effects of Twitter suspensions on 
ISIS supporters is an extremely complex task for 
two reasons: 
•	No one has until now adequately publicly de-
scribed the size of the community of ISIS sup-
porters on Twitter, nor defined an adequately 
large sample group for study.
•	Suspensions inherently change the composition 
of a comparison set. As a result, the manner in 
which comparison sets are derived is crucial to a 
credible assessment. 
The methodology described in section 3 can provide 
a starting point for additional, rigorous research 
on this important topic by defining a method to 
develop clearly comparable datasets over time. As 
such, the data collected herein is more of a starting 
2.5 
Suspensions
ly more than 25 percent of all accounts were fol-
lowed by more than twice as many accounts as they 
followed, some with very high multiples (reflecting 
in part, popular information sources which broad-
cast but do not follow). The remainder fell into a 
range of followers-to-friends of 0.5 to 2.0. 
point for future research, rather than a basis for a 
fully formed argument. 
While this analysis was not designed to produce a 
definitive endpoint for analyzing the effects of sus-
pensions, there are a substantial number of key pre-
liminary data points.
2.5.1 
Number of observed suspensions
790 accounts were suspended between the collection 
of user information in September through October 
and early January. Out of these, 678 were in the De-
mographics Dataset, with another 112 in the full col-
lection (an expected finding given that ISIS support-
ers were by design more concentrated in the Demo-
graphics Dataset). Another 92 accounts were detected 
Figure 16: Performance of suspended ISIS supporters compared to non-suspended supporters
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as having been suspended during the collection pro-
cess, and were thus omitted from the database.
The 678 suspended accounts in the Demograph-
ics Dataset had an average of 1,995 followers each, 
compared to an average of 969 followers for users 
who were not suspended. They tweeted an average 
of 46.6 times per day and received 141.2 retweets 
(in their 200 most recent tweets) compared to 14.5 
tweets per day and 15.2 retweets received for users 
who were not suspended.
This data is unambiguous: Users who were sus-
pended were far more active and the content they 
generated was far more likely to become viral than 
users who were not suspended. No single factor ap-
peared to be more important than any other. 
While some accounts showed little sign of activ-
ity or virality in the first collected sample, we did 
not monitor their activity in between the two col-
lections, and they may have become more active 
prior to suspension. Had that data been available, 
we expect it would show that the disparity between 
suspended and non-suspended accounts was even 
higher than recorded. 
In addition to the accounts for which we had col-
lected full data, we were also able to observe a very 
large number of suspensions in the Level 2 set of 
approximately 2 million accounts, consisting of 
nearly 18,000 accounts. Based on the structure 
of the collection process, we believe a significant 
number of these suspensions were ISIS-related, but 
we could not make a definitive conclusion with the 
data at hand. 
2.5.2 
Suspensions of accounts created  
in September and October 2014
Significantly, 57 percent of the suspended accounts 
in the Demographics Dataset had been created in 
August, September, and October of 2014, again 
pointing to the possibility of repeated suspensions 
of single users during the period. 
Our process did not fully account for suspen-
sions of accounts created during the collection 
period, such as a user who was suspended, re-
turned with a new account, and was immediately 
suspended again. 
We speculate that this number is considerably high-
er than is reflected our findings and likely accounts 
for many of the 18,000 suspensions for which we 
could not obtain complete data. While our tracking 
of the 20,000 accounts in the Demographics Data-
set only found about 678 suspensions as of January 
2015, we created Twitter lists to monitor the con-
tent of the dataset during the same period, and saw 
many complaints about suspended accounts as well 
as announcements of returned accounts. 
In short, the original network suffered only a 3.4 
percent loss in membership between the first col-
lection and January 2015, and the subsequent sus-
pensions appear to have targeted new and returning 
accounts. The Level 2 suspension data could also 
point to such activity. The pace of suspensions ap-
pears to have maintained the network at a reduced 
level, rather than shrinking it significantly. 
2.5.3 
Performance of accounts  
that were not suspended 
All of the figures above pertain to the data collected 
in September through December 2014. We also 
compared certain performance elements of non-
suspended accounts collected in the fall of 2014 to 
their performance in January 2015. 
We could not complete a full iteration generating a 
new and more comparable set in the time available. 
There were a number of problems with using only 
the non-suspended accounts as a comparison set:
•	The original set is not properly considered a 
pre-suspension set, since a very aggressive regi-
men of suspensions started shortly before our 
data collection began and continued through-
out this process.
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•	New users who should properly be accounted 
for in evaluating the network’s performance were 
omitted from the second collection. 
•	Terrorists attacked the office of the Charlie Hebdo 
magazine in Paris in the midst of the January col-
lection, resulting in a spike in coordinated tweet-
ing activity from ISIS supporters being driven by 
influential users, as well as a wave of additional 
suspensions and name changes. We were unable 
to quantify this activity or to estimate its impact 
beyond simply noting it was observed. 
We discovered that 421 bots had been included in 
the Demographics Dataset because their behavior did 
not, at the time of the original collection, meet the 
criteria we had set for exclusion. They had been acti-
vated after the suspensions began and were tweeting 
at a high volume in January. Because of this—and the 
complexity of mid-stream name changes and suspen-
sions—there also was a 0.02 percent difference in the 
number of accounts in the two comparison sets. The 
total number of accounts compared between the peri-
ods was approximately 18,500.
During collection of comparison data in January 
2015, 72 accounts either changed their names or 
were suspended. Approximately another 30 disap-
peared in between the time we identified accounts 
that had not been suspended and our collection of 
tweet performance data, a relatively short period. 
With these substantial caveats in place, we made 
the following comparisons: 
Figure 17: Change in performance, non-suspended ISIS supporting accounts, Fall 2014 versus January 2015 
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The average user tweeted less in January, despite 
heightened activity around the Hebdo attack during 
the collection cycle. The interactions shown in Figure 
17 are delimited to only those taking place within the 
set (i.e., one user in the set retweeting another user). 
As would be expected when key influencers are 
continually being removed from the ecosystem, us-
ers showed signs of being more internally focused 
on network members, with more retweets of con-
tent produced by other members of the network. 
These changes were relatively modest, however, 
likely because suspensions were already underway 
when collection started. 
As expected, the average number of friends and fol-
lowers per account increased modestly. Twitter ac-
2.5.4 
Partial comparison data 
While we could not recreate the entire collection pro-
cess in the time available, we produced a limited com-
parison set using the iterative process described above. 
It became apparent immediately that the composition 
of the network had changed. 
counts which remain active almost always add fol-
lowers, barring manipulative activity. The number 
of protected accounts in the network rose from 407 
to 495, likely due to suspensions. 
These metrics are of limited utility in under-
standing changes to the overall performance, 
because of the lack of a directly comparable set. 
Using an iterative process of collection would 
make it possible over time to create more 
valid comparisons. 
In light of these limitations, we also examined the 
performance of tweets that originated with mem-
bers of the network. In-network retweets dropped 
by almost 19 percent, while out-of-network 
retweets increased by just over 3 percent. 
The original 454 seed accounts (described in section 
3.1) had followed almost 47,000 accounts (Level 1). 
Despite repeatedly broadening the criteria for seed ac-
counts, we were unable to create a new Level 1 set of 
the same size in the time available. 
This strongly suggested that the network had been 
substantially reduced and that the updated network 
Figure 18: Change in performance of tweets by ISIS supporters, Fall 2014 versus January 2015
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17. J.M. Berger, “Zero Degrees of al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy, 14 August 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/14/zero-degrees-
of-al-qaeda/. 
was much more internally focused, meaning ISIS 
supporters were increasingly following other ISIS sup-
porters rather than a broader selection of accounts. 
This could also suggest that it was more difficult for 
ISIS supporters to discover other ISIS supporters to 
follow. Twitter’s recommendations engine influenced 
this dynamic. In 2013, a study by J.M. Berger found 
that Twitter’s “who to follow” recommendations made 
it easy to discover jihadist accounts, once a user started 
following even one or two jihadist supporters.17 
In February 2015, we recreated that experiment using 
ISIS-supporting accounts and found that the “who 
to follow” recommendations pointed to virtually no 
other jihadist accounts. However, Twitter later sent 
recommendations via email that accurately suggested 
ISIS supporters to follow. While the recommendation 
process took longer than it did in 2013, the net result 
was very similar. 
We seeded a new collection using 550 accounts from 
the original set that were still active in January and 
February 2015, and after weeding for bots and ac-
counts with more than 50,000 followers (the same 
criteria used for the Demographics Dataset), just un-
der 25,000 accounts remained at Level 1. 
All figures described in this paper as in-network met-
rics (referring primarily to interactions or in-network 
friends and followers) pertain to the overall dataset 
collected. For example, to calculate the number of 
replies received within the network of the fall collec-
tion, we defined “within the network” as the entire 
Census Dataset of about 47,000 accounts. However, 
the average number of replies received is the average 
of this full-set figure among only the accounts in the 
Demographics Dataset. 
For the February dataset, similarly, the in-network cal-
culations apply to the 27,000 total accounts we col-
lected, prior to weeding. The averages for February are 
calculated using the full-set figures but averaging the 
totals only for the weeded set. 
Due to time constraints, we did not collect informa-
tion about which accounts the Level 1 users followed, 
and thus could not recreate the sorting metric (sec-
tion 3.6). A casual examination of the set of 23,000 
showed a very high incidence of ISIS supporters 
throughout the set. 
Quantifiably, 660 accounts out of the 25,000 self-
identified as ISIS supporters using the quick-code cri-
teria, comparing very strongly to the 602 self-identi-
fied accounts in the Demographics Dataset of 20,000. 
These data points strongly indicate that the ISIS-
supporting social network on Twitter has been sig-
nificantly constrained by the suspension campaign. 
We believe it is likely that the current size of the ISIS-
supporting social network is lower than the fall 2014 
estimate, and the estimated minimum could be as low 
as 30,000 at the time of writing. 
The comparison set also revealed evidence that ISIS 
supporters were wearying of the battle with Twitter, 
using the number of new accounts as a barometer. 
While the spree of suspensions in September 2014 
correlated to the creation of nearly 3,500 new ac-
counts (section 1.7), the comparison data showed a 
steep decline in new account creation in the following 
months. This suggests that ISIS supporters were less 
often creating new accounts to replace those suspend-
ed, although it may also pertain to varying levels of 
suspension activity, which we were unable to estimate.
Both the original and the February 2015 analyses 
found similar numbers of accounts that had been 
created in September (accounting for the suspension 
trends described above), further reinforcing our belief 
that this more limited dataset is fairly representative of 
the overall current state of ISIS Twitter. 
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Figure 19: Month of account creation, February 2015 collection sample
Retweets received from other members of the network 
averaged 11.3 per user, compared to about 19.4 per 
user in the Demographics Dataset, a significant de-
cline. However, we again stress that the two sets are 
not perfectly comparable. Received replies in the Feb-
ruary set averaged 3.2 per user, compared to 5.19. 
Tweets per day averaged 18.8, compared to 15.5 in 
the Demographics Dataset. This is significant in light 
of the decreased interactions described above. Users in 
the February set tweeted more, even as they recorded 
fewer interactions. However, the additional noise in 
the February set may distort these figures somewhat. 
In the wake of Twitter’s suspension campaign, users re-
sponded by aggressively promoting new accounts that 
had replaced suspended accounts. Typically, tweets 
promoting ISIS accounts included a list of accounts 
with descriptive text. Our analysis isolated these as 
“non-reply mentions”—the inclusion of a Twitter 
handle in a tweet that is not a reply to another tweet.
In the February collection, users sent an average of 
17.4 non-reply mentions to other users in the net-
work, but received only 12 in return. In the Demo-
graphics Dataset from fall 2014, users sent an aver-
age of 12 non-reply mentions and received 10.4. 
To produce a cleaner comparison, we also looked at 
these figures for accounts with fewer than 20,000 
followers in both sets, expected to result in a higher 
proportion of ISIS-supporting accounts per the 
earlier analysis. The noise in the February dataset 
was especially concentrated among high-follower 
accounts. This figure was particularly telling. In 
the February collection, these users sent an average 
of 40.3 non-reply mentions to other users in the 
network, but received only 8.6. In the Fall 2014 
collection, users sent 11.9 non-reply mentions and 
received 9.8. 
This data yields two major implications: 
1. The amount of activity devoted to rebuilding 
the Twitter network (as opposed to disseminat-
ing propaganda, recruiting and other activities) 
more than tripled. 
2. A five-to-one disparity opened up between the 
average non-reply mentions sent and the aver-
age received, indicating that the greatly increased 
activity was directed at fewer accounts. In other 
words, users were working much, much harder 
to promote the top accounts in the network. 
The increased amount of promotional activity 
did not correlate to an increase in the number of 
in-network accounts being promoted. 
An interesting result running counter to the overall 
trend of depressed activity in the network pertained 
to follower counts. For the sets delimited to fewer 
than 20,000 followers each, the average number of 
followers nearly doubled from fall 2014 to February 
2015—from 725 to 1408—with significantly fewer 
accounts recorded as having less than 200 followers, 
when compared to the Demographics Dataset. A pos-
sible explanation is discussed in section 4.3, which ex-
amines some of the potential tradeoffs incurred when 
degrading the network’s overall performance.
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3. 
Methodology
Many claims regarding ISIS social media are based 
on data and methods that are—at best—unclear 
and often completely undisclosed. Therefore, we 
decided at the outset of this project to disclose how 
we collected and analyzed data in substantial detail, 
so that readers can understand how the findings 
were derived and to inform future research. 
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3.1
Starting Point
Co-author J.M. Berger spent much of 2014 identi-
fying and collecting Twitter accounts for ISIS sup-
porters using a variety of methods, including social 
network analysis and manual selection. 
This starting list consisted of approximately 4,700 
accounts around the time that the project began. 
Dozens were identified as particularly important 
supporters and members of ISIS’s dedicated media 
and social media teams. 
In the summer of 2014, ISIS’s official accounts 
were suspended by Twitter. Several proxies for the 
official accounts were added to the list over time 
and monitored. 
This starting dataset was monitored by reading 
tweets by users on a near daily basis. This method 
was revised over the course of several months, dur-
ing which some users were weeded from the set af-
ter a review of their content suggested they were 
not unambiguous ISIS supporters. 
Examples of non-supporters who show up in ISIS 
social networks include a relatively small number 
of journalists and academic researchers; accounts 
whose interests overlap with ISIS in an adversarial 
way, such as accounts controlled by supporters of 
other jihadist factions in Syria, including Jabhat al 
Nusra and Ahrar al Sham; and online jihadist activ-
ists associated with al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
At the outset of the project, the most engaged ac-
counts in the dataset were identified using a refined 
version of the methodology outlined in Berger and 
Strathearn’s study “Who Matters Online: Measur-
ing influence, evaluating content and countering 
violent extremism in online social networks.”18 
Data was collected by proprietary software origi-
nally coded by Dan Sturtevant using guidelines set 
out by J.M. Berger, with collection and analytical 
revisions specific to this project written by Jona-
thon Morgan. 
The initial process of identifying a larger set of 
ISIS supporters involved collecting all of the ac-
counts followed by the seed accounts (“friends” 
of the seeds). 
Our guiding analytical principle was that an ISIS 
supporter online could be best defined as someone 
who was followed by at least one other ISIS sup-
porter, rather than someone who tweeted specific 
kinds of content within a particular time frame. 
This approach was taken in part because of an ob-
served trend of ISIS supporters deleting or protect-
ing their tweets, but also because extremists—for-
eign fighters especially—may be subject to external 
pressures that cause them to go silent, such as lack 
of Internet access or intelligence agency scrutiny. 
Some also use Twitter purely for private messaging 
or covert signaling, a behavior that has been ob-
served. Barring a few truly rare covert accounts, an 
ISIS supporter of any significance in the contexts 
above should at some point be followed by least 
one other ISIS supporter. 
In contrast, follower lists tend to be filled with ob-
servers, including adversaries, spies, and researchers. 
Passive accounts used by researchers and analysts, 
for instance, might follow many ISIS supporters 
and be followed by few or none. By limiting the 
direction of collection to following lists, we hoped 
to minimize the impact of such noise. 
Following general observations of Twitter activity, 
we decided to limit the seed accounts based on the 
number of accounts each candidate followed. Users 
employ different strategies to following other us-
ers on Twitter. Some follow everyone who follows 
them, either as a courtesy or as a social marketing 
tactic. Others follow a wide variety of accounts in 
order to obtain information from many sources; 
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however, extremists tend to rely more on news from 
within their own circles. 
Based on anecdotal observation and the amount of 
time required for collection (see section 3.2), we 
designated accounts following 500 or fewer oth-
ers as optimally focused and least likely to produce 
noise in the form of non-ISIS-supporting accounts. 
We also limited the seeds to accounts that had 
tweeted within four months preceding the start of 
collection in September. We did this to eliminate 
a very large number of accounts that had tweeted 
only through a known ISIS Twitter strategy, the use 
of the “Dawn of Glad Tidings” auto-tweeting app 
(described in section 1.13). 
In the end, a final analysis of the candidate accounts 
was performed in late September and early October 
2014, and a total of 454 accounts were selected to 
serve as “seeds” for the ISIS Twitter Census dataset. 
We collected all of the accounts they followed, for 
an initial Census Dataset of 49,379 accounts. 
A quick review of the data indicated that ISIS sup-
porters were extremely unlikely to have more than 
50,000 followers, likely the result of Twitter under-
taking a substantial initiative to suspend ISIS sup-
porters starting in September. An initial review of 
accounts with more than 50,000 followers revealed 
that they were obviously and overwhelmingly re-
lated to topics other than ISIS. 
In light of this, all accounts with more than 50,000 
followers were removed from the Census dataset after 
initial data and some simple metrics were calculated. 
3.2 
Challenges and Caveats
A number of unusual factors complicate analysis of 
ISIS Twitter networks. Although some factors are 
related to operational security, Twitter’s campaign 
of suspending ISIS supporter accounts was respon-
sible for the most significant challenges, either 
directly or indirectly. A brief list of some of these 
complications should highlight important caveats 
on this research. 
•	Suspensions: The number of ISIS accounts be-
ing suspended by Twitter on a regular basis ap-
pears to be much higher than previously re-
ported. Because our data collection and analysis 
methods require time to complete, accounts were 
suspended and created in the middle of the col-
lection process, skewing results. 
•	Name changes and voluntary deletions: In 
an effort to avoid suspension, some ISIS users 
changed their screen names or deleted their ac-
counts during the process of analysis, skewing 
results. Our analysis was generally able to ac-
count for name changes, but some distortions 
may have occurred. 
•	Private accounts: For reasons of operational se-
curity or as a hedge against suspensions, some 
users either temporarily or permanently set their 
privacy settings to “Protect Tweets,” which pre-
vented analysis of their content and inhibited, 
but did not entirely prevent, analysis of their re-
lationships. While this tactic was much discussed 
in circle circles of ISIS users, it was not observed 
to be widely deployed in practice. 
•	Multiple accounts by the same user: In some 
cases, ISIS supporters who anticipated being sus-
pended maintained multiple backup accounts. 
We did not attempt to eliminate these accounts 
from our analysis. Based on anecdotal observa-
tion, they likely represent less than 1 percent of 
the total collected; additional investigation might 
provide a more definitive estimate. 
•	Non-organic noise: Some users employed 
guidelines published by ISIS social media strat-
egists, instructing them to follow large num-
bers of accounts which were not fully relevant 
to ISIS. The purpose of adding this noise to the 
system was generally to avoid suspension, but 
it may have a related function of complicating 
analyses such as this one. 
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•	Tweet deletion: A relatively small number of 
ISIS-supporting Twitter users employ services 
that allow them to delete all of their tweets, or 
were noted to delete tweets manually. 
•	Deceptive practices: ISIS uses several practic-
es designed to amplify its apparent support on 
Twitter, including “bots” (computer software 
that creates activity on a social media account 
in the absence of a human user) and spam 
(purchased tweets promoting ISIS content). 
We were able to compensate for this, although 
not perfectly. 
•	Size of the dataset: Certain practical consid-
erations come into play when dealing with a 
very large dataset, primarily restrictions on the 
speed of data collection speed. Twitter enforces 
such restrictions regarding friend and follower 
relationships. Some of these issues are detailed 
in Appendix B. Over the course of data collec-
tion, the dataset changed composition between 
the start and end of the process, complicating 
analysis. For instance, in addition to the sus-
pensions noted above, most accounts added 
followers during collection. 
Each of these limitations can be compensated for 
using analytical techniques. Some are more dif-
ficult to offset than others, and each one adds a 
certain amount of noise to the final dataset even 
after compensation. Some of these effects and 
compensating analytical approaches will be de-
scribed more fully below. 
3.3 
Bot and Spam Detection 
ISIS is known to use a variety of deceptive tech-
niques to inflate the appearance of support online, 
including apps, bots and spam services (see com-
ments and definitions above under ISIS Supporter 
Basic Metrics). 
At one point, ISIS employed a single, widely ad-
opted app that automatically tweeted information 
out from thousands of ISIS-supporter accounts.19 
For some of these accounts, the user also tweeted 
normally. Others only sent tweets generated by the 
app. All of the latter accounts were simple to re-
move from our analysis. 
Since Twitter terminated this app in June 2014, ISIS 
supporters have implemented new apps. Unlike the 
original app, these use a variety of techniques and are 
not subject to a single point of failure that would en-
able them to be silenced en masse. The tradeoff is that 
the new apps and bots are also less synchronized and 
therefore less powerful (see section 1.13)
The metrics we applied to rank accounts (section 
3.6) naturally downplay such deceptive techniques, 
but do not totally eliminate them. Therefore we 
took steps to eliminate accounts that were primar-
ily controlled by bots and apps from the set. 
A variety of techniques used in past research by 
J.M. Berger have proven effective in identifying 
bots and were applied to this process. The two most 
important in this context were identical tweets and 
Twitter platform information. 
Identical tweets are tweets that contain identical text 
but are not retweets. A large number of an account’s 
tweets that are identical to other tweets in the dataset is 
a strong indicator of a bot or spam account. Through 
manual spot-checking of accounts and correlation 
with Twitter platform information, we estimated that 
accounts with more than 30 identical tweets among 
the tweets collected were most likely to be bot or spam 
accounts, and were thus removed from the dataset.
Twitter platform information is associated with 
each individual tweet, indicating whether the tweet 
was sent from the Twitter web page or from a Twit-
ter client such as Tweetdeck. Because this can be 
falsified, platform information alone was not an 
adequate indicator. Many tweets were sent us-
ing apps that clearly identified themselves as bots, 
spammers, or automated services. Accounts that 
sent most or all of their tweets using such platforms 
were removed from the dataset. 
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These conservative steps did not completely elimi-
nate bots and spammers from the data. 421 more 
accounts were discovered to be bots in a second col-
lection of tweets in January 2015; they were not 
detected in the first round of eliminations because 
they had not been fully activated. 
Slightly more than 3,000 accounts were eliminated 
from the Census Dataset as likely bots or apps prior to 
the scoring and selection of the Demographics Data-
set. This conservative approach allowed for the reten-
tion of some users who employed apps in addition to 
tweeting normally. Many of the remaining bots and 
spammers were ranked as less likely to be ISIS sup-
porters by the natural function of the other metrics. 
3.4 
Description of Data Collected
Armed with the 454 seeds, we proceeded to collect 
user information and the 200 most recent tweets of 
all accounts followed by the seed accounts, as well 
as user IDs for accounts followed by the new group 
of users. We distinguish between the different types 
of information collected in the following ways: 
•	The seed accounts were designated Level 0.
•	 The people they followed were designated Level 1. 
•	The people followed by Level 1 users were desig-
nated Level 2. 
•	Accounts mentioned by Level 1 users who were 
not part of Level 1 were designated as Level 3. 
Some Level 3 members were later determined to 
be members of Level 2 as well. 
For Levels 0 and 1, all user information, tweets, and 
following/followed relationships were collected. 
For Level 2, only numerical user IDs were collected 
at the outset, but the data collected at Level 1 in-
dicated how many Level 1 accounts followed each 
Level 2 account. For Level 3, only Twitter handles 
were collected. 
There were almost 2 million users at Level 2, pre-
senting an obstacle to collecting data in a timely 
manner. In December 2014, we collected user 
information for all Level 2 users that were still 
active. We did not collect following/followed re-
lationships or tweets, but we were able to infer 
some information about those data points from 
the data previously collected. 
After the initial rounds of data collection described 
above, we analyzed the results and experimented 
with several different approaches to sorting and 
classifying the accounts for which we had collected 
adequate data. 
The tables below outline the data collection and 
level classifications. 
Network Level
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Definition of Level
Initial seed accounts selected
All accounts followed  
by Level 0 accounts
All accounts followed by Level 1 
accounts that were not already 
found in Level 0 or Level 1
Accounts mentioned by  
Level 1 users who were  
not part of Level 1
Data Collected
All user and profile information, last 200 tweets of 
each user, list of users followed by each seed account
First round collection: All user and profile  
information, last 200 tweets of each user 
Second round: All user and profile information,  
last 200 tweets of each user, list of users followed  
by each Level 1 account
Second round: Numerical user IDs collected 
Third round: User information collected 
First round: Only Twitter handles collected
Third round: Some user information collected
Table 1: Classifications of data collected
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Data Collected
User information
Tweets
Following 
relationships
Definition
Includes username, display name, numerical ID, 
followers, following (friends), URL of profile image, 
total number of tweets over the lifetime of the account, 
date that the account was created, profile text, location 
(if provided), web site link (as shortened by Twitter) 
and other data
Last 200 tweets were collected for Level 0 and Level 
1 users. Includes text of tweet, time of tweet, location 
information (if provided), platform used to send tweet
The accounts followed by a Twitter user
Amount
This data was collected for  
more than 2 million accounts
This data was collected for  
just over 49,000 accounts
This data was collected for  
just over 49,000 accounts
Table 2: Description of data collected
3.5 
Data Codebook 
Samples of Twitter accounts from the collected data 
were coded to evaluate which ones were ISIS support-
ers and which were not. In cases where an account’s 
standing was ambiguous, it was weighted as half of a 
full supporter. The following criteria were applied, in 
the following order, to determine whether a user was 
an ISIS supporter:
•	The content of the user’s tweets were examined 
to see if they were unambiguously for or against 
ISIS. If tweet content included both ISIS and 
non-ISIS jihadist content, or was strongly incon-
sistent with ISIS’s stated values and ideology, the 
user was coded as a non-supporter. 
•	 If the first step did not produce a conclusive re-
sult, a user’s profile and profile images were ex-
amined for indications the user was an ISIS sup-
porter (i.e., using the ISIS black flag or displaying 
pictures of ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi).
•	 In the absence of both tweets and profile identi-
fiers indicating a clear preference, the user’s list of 
followers was examined. If, on subjective exami-
nation, a significant proportion of their followers 
used profile markers to clearly indicate support 
for ISIS in the absence of anti-ISIS users (such as 
members of Jabhat al Nusra), the user was coded 
as an ISIS supporter. 
•	 If all other criteria failed, we examined who 
the user followed. If that list was substantially 
focused on ISIS supporters in the absence of a 
meaningful number of non-supporters, it was 
coded as a supporter. 
•	 If an account was suspended, it was presumed to 
be an ISIS supporter, given the context of the col-
lection process. At the time of collection, Twit-
ter suspensions were highly focused on ISIS. If 
we were repeating collection in the current envi-
ronment at the time of writing, we would likely 
consider a different approach, since Twitter has 
begun suspending non-ISIS jihadists more ag-
gressively in the interim. 
•	 If an account was deleted by the user and not by 
Twitter, it was scored as a 50 percent probability 
the user was an ISIS supporter. However, there is 
reason to think that total may be higher as many 
ISIS users deleted their accounts around the time 
Twitter began its crackdown. 
•	We also performed a quick-coding process in 
which all users in the Census dataset who explicitly 
identified with ISIS in their user handles or profile 
information were identified by keyword searches. 
Keywords included ISIS, _IS or IS_, the ISIS slogan 
baqiyah and variations thereof, as well as references 
to the Islamic State or the caliphate using common 
phrases in both English and Arabic. These results 
were vetted for obviously non-responsive accounts 
(such as strings using “thisis” [this is] or accounts 
whose handles indicated opposition to ISIS. The 
quick-coding results were primarily used to measure 
the overall effectiveness of the metrics (section 3.6) 
rather than the accuracy of the overall set. 
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We examined and coded a random sample of 
1,000 Twitter accounts extracted from a slightly 
smaller dataset derived in a method identical to 
the main Census dataset (and with substantial 
overlap). Within the random sample, 65 percent 
of accounts were clearly ISIS supporters, 5 per-
cent were ambiguous, and 30 percent were non-
supporters. We relied on this number as a kind 
of control group, in the sense that results which 
appeared dramatically out of line would be scru-
tinized carefully for methodological errors. 
After eliminating all likely bots and all accounts 
with more than 50,000 followers from the Cen-
sus dataset, we were left with 43,538 accounts 
to evaluate as ISIS supporters or non-support-
ers.20 We experimented with several different 
methods of sorting the Census Dataset accord-
ing to the probability that an account belonged 
to an ISIS supporter. 
We evaluated each of the metrics using visualiza-
tions of accounts quick-coded as ISIS supporters 
within the refined Census dataset of 43,538 ac-
counts. In Figures 20, 21 and 22, responsive ac-
Coded results from the random sample were integrat-
ed into the main Census Database. We additionally 
coded ranges of accounts according to ranking using 
the metrics in section 3.6, in order to gauge the effec-
tiveness of the metrics at different levels. 
For accounts coded as ambiguous, an additional re-
view was made of all metrics collected to see if the 
account in question could be further resolved. In 
the final codebook, 4 percent of all coded samples 
were recorded as ambiguous. 
counts are represented by blue bars, and non-re-
sponsive accounts are represented by white bars. 
Each chart is ranked left to right, meaning that bars 
to the left scored higher using the designated metric 
than bars to the right. A concentration of blue bars 
on the left of the chart indicated the metric was 
more successful at sorting relevant accounts than 
one in which the blue bars were spread out over the 
whole chart. The blue bars are slightly weighted for 
more convenient viewing, slightly overrepresent-
ing the proportion of responsive accounts in visual 
terms relative to numerical precision.
3.6 
Sorting Metrics 
Figure 20: Responsive accounts (blue bars) ranked left to right by engagement method as detailed in 
“Who Matters Online”
Figure 21: Ranked by ratio of in-network-followers to out-of-network followers
Figure 22: Ranked by metric combining weighted clique membership, in- and out-of-network followers, 
and engagement
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We experimented with more than a dozen sorting 
metrics. Three are depicted in the charts above. The 
first metric was the engagement metric described at 
greater length in the “Who Matters Online” paper. 
As can be seen in Figure 20, this produced a better 
than random result, but responsive accounts were still 
significantly distributed throughout the set. The en-
gagement metric tends to produce a very relevant list 
of accounts at the highest-scoring levels, but many rel-
evant accounts are still found at lower-scoring levels. 
At the outset of the project, we intended to examine 
two additional properties for their merits in sorting 
relevant accounts: cliqueishness and in-network fo-
cus. Both showed significant strengths and weakness-
es individually; when combined they proved more 
powerful than any of the other approaches we tried. 
Cliques are network structures in which every node 
is connected to every other node. In a social net-
work, this is most easily understood as a group of 
users in which every member of the group follows 
every other member.21 As we define it, cliqueishness 
represents a Twitter account’s proximity to cliques 
in the network, measured by the number of a user’s 
friends who belong to cliques. 
When a network reaches even a modest size, the num-
ber of cliques it contains quickly becomes too large 
to compute.22 Therefore we had to impose limits on 
our calculations. We tried different approaches to 
generating cliques, including an iterative-deepening 
approach (building out from the seed accounts) and 
a top-vertices approach (building out from the 100 
most-connected entities in the graph). As neither of 
these proved entirely satisfactory, we opted instead to 
use what we defined as in-network focus to identify 
the most useful starting points to search for cliques. 
In-network focus indicates whether a member of the 
network follows more accounts within the Level 0 
and Level 1 network than outside (total number of 
friends minus in-network friends). Since Level 0 was 
comprised entirely of ISIS supporters and Level 1 was 
heavily slanted toward ISIS supporters, we theorized 
that users whose networks were more concentrated 
internally would be more likely to be ISIS supporters. 
We also chose the 100 most internally focused ac-
counts as a starting point to generate cliques. 
As seen in Figure 21, the ratio of a user’s in-net-
work friends to out-network friends resulted in 
some very accurate hits at the top, but with many 
responsive accounts near the bottom as well. These 
represented users whose network connections were 
primarily outside the Level 0/1 network but who 
were still ISIS supporters. Overall, while the results 
had some merit, an unacceptable number of ISIS 
supporters scored too low using only the in/out ra-
tio to serve as a primary metric. 
After a considerable amount of trial-and-error ex-
perimentation, we developed the metric visualized 
in Figure 22, the most effective approach we tried. 
While some other metrics were equally or nearly 
as effective within the top 20,000 accounts, the 
metric shown in Figure 22 was more effective at 
lower ranges as well. The formula combined and 
weighted many of the previously successful metrics 
and thereby produced the strongest results. 
The approach added the total number of each user’s: 
•	 In-network friends;
•	 In-network followers multiplied by eight for 
weighting purposes; 
•	The sum of the in-network friends of all the users 
in the largest clique to which the user belonged, 
multiplied by 16;
•	We added one metric that may be peculiar to this 
dataset. In the wake of Twitter’s suspension cam-
paign, users responded by aggressively promoting 
new accounts. Typically, tweets promoting ISIS 
accounts included a list of accounts with descrip-
tive text. Our analysis broke these out as “non-
reply mentions”— the inclusion of a Twitter han-
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dle in a tweet that is not a reply to another tweet. 
We weighted these mentions by multiplying the 
number of non-reply mentions that an account 
received by four. Because ordinary Twitter users 
also employ non-reply mentions—for example, 
when recommending accounts to follow—so this 
metric may also apply to non-ISIS networks, but 
would likely require a different level of weighting 
(see Control Group, Appendix B). 
The sum of these measurements was then multi-
plied by the ratio of the user’s followers within the 
network (Level 0/1) divided by the number outside 
the network (total number of followers minus in-
network followers). 
We dubbed the metric IQI (for its major compo-
nents, in-network, clique, and interaction). 
3.7 
Metrics Performance and Estimates
The IQI metric performed accurately at several 
ranges, allowing an estimate of the total number of 
ISIS supporters in the Census dataset. The table be-
low shows the breakdown of accounts as measured 
by a random sample. 
The sample was slightly clumpy, resulting in un-
even distribution, with a disproportionate number 
of accounts randomly falling into 1 to 10,000 range 
and the 30,000 to 40,000 range, biasing the results 
for the top 20,000 and the lower 23,000 slightly 
higher. Part of the reason for this incongruity is the 
difference in size of the dataset used for random 
coding, which was collected earlier than the main 
census dataset and therefore had fewer members. 
In order to produce an evenly distributed sample 
and understand the trend produced by the metrics, 
we also coded accounts in consecutive panels of 
200 at different ranges within the set. The panel 
from 20,000 to 20,199 was included calculations 
for both the top 20,000 and lower 23,000 to even 
out the distribution of coded accounts. 
The random sample was coded first; therefore ac-
counts already coded were not recoded. While 
coding guidelines were fairly robust, the researcher 
coding most of the ranged sample was slightly more 
conservative (i.e., less likely to designate any given 
account as a supporter) than the researcher coding 
the random sample, due to having more experience 
with the subject matter. When an account was des-
ignated as unclear, a second coder reviewed the ac-
count using additional metrics to see if it could be 
resolved. If this was not possible, the account was 
marked as 50 percent responsive. 
Table 3: Accuracy of metrics based on random sample of 1,000 coded accounts taken from entire set
Ranking Using IQI Metric
1 to 200
1 to 5,000
1 to 10,000
10,000 to 20,000
20,000 to 30,000
30,000 to end
TOTAL
ISIS Supporters
98.5 percent
94.3 percent
94.8 percent
93.4 percent
77.1 percent
29 percent
~31,012 responsive accounts (71.2 percent of total set)
Combined Coded Results in Range
94.5 percent
50.9 percent
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Figure 23: Accuracy of IQI metric according to range of scores (high to low)
While the ranged coded accounts provided supe-
rior distribution of the sample, the nature of the 
metrics—specifically a heavy weighting of cliques 
and non-reply mentions—may have produced 
streaks of unusually high or low values. 
To test this theory, we coded a range of 300 ac-
counts from a position slightly higher than the me-
dian of the Census Dataset (at and after the cutoff 
for inclusion in the Demographics Dataset, and 
where we might expect more ambiguous findings) 
and found evidence to support our theory (Figure 
24). Within the run of 300, relevance increased as 
the IQI metric decreased, despite the strong broad-
er trend of positive correlation between relevance 
and IQI score. 
A more detailed examination of the entire Cen-
sus Dataset found that the IQI metric tended to 
produce runs of accounts with an identical score 
greater than zero in certain ranges after the top 
2,000, as the input data became more uniform, 
which may also have contributed to the streaks. 
These runs typically lasted less than 10 accounts, 
but in rare cases were as high as 85. A long run 
of scores equaling zero was found in the lower 
Ranking Using IQI Metric
1 to 200
5,000 to 5,199
10,000 to 10,199
15,000 to 15,199
20,000 to 20,199
30,000 to 30,199
40,000 to 40,199
TOTAL
ISIS Supporters
98.5 percent
93.7 percent
88.3 percent
86.8 percent
76.8 percent
48 percent
26.3 percent
Combined Coded Results in Range
91.8 percent
50.3 percent
74 percent
98.5
1 to 200
93.7
5,000  
to 5,199
88.3
10,000  
to 10,199
86.8
15,000  
to 15,199
76.8
20,000  
to 20,199
48
30,000  
to 30,199
26.3
40,000  
to 40,199
Percentage Accuracy by IQI Ranking
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5,000 accounts, signaling that sorting in that 
range was essentially nonexistent. 
Within the sample of 300 consecutive scored ac-
counts, streaks of non-responsive or ambiguous 
accounts (such as accounts that did not overtly 
The final total for the overall set skews slightly 
higher due to additional ranged samples near the 
top. However, the metrics values flattened in the 
bottom half, somewhat offsetting the impact of 
the distribution imbalance. Our final estimate 
for the number of ISIS supporters in the Census 
Dataset is closer to 70 percent, in line with our 
initial “reality check” random sample. We esti-
mate a rounded total of approximately 35,000 
ISIS supporters within the Census Dataset. 
Merging all of the recorded values from both the 
random and ranged coded sets produced the fol-
lowing results:
support ISIS) appeared to correlate with higher 
numbers of either in-network friends or follow-
ers. This suggests such accounts represent sources 
of information or opinion that were highly rel-
evant to ISIS supporters, even if they did not 
overtly support ISIS in tweets. 
Based on the figures from each analysis and the com-
bined results, along with other factors noted above, we 
estimated that the top 20,000 accounts would consist 
of approximately 93 percent overt ISIS supporters, 
with a margin of error of about 2.54 percent. There 
was a strong potential that highly relevant accounts in 
the set did not meet our conservative criteria for desig-
nating a user as a supporter. We used the set of 20,000 
set to analyze the demographic information presented 
earlier in this report. 
Figure 24: Streaks of ambiguous accounts were seen in the sample, due to the nature of the metrics. Blue bars 
represent ISIS supporters, white bars represent non-supporters, and half-bars represent accounts that could not  
be conclusively identified as supporters or non-supporters. The orange line represents the IQI score. 
Table 4: Accuracy of metrics, all manually coded samples
Ranking Using IQI Metric
1 to 9,999
10,000 to 20,000
20,001 to end
TOTAL
ISIS Supporters
96 percent
89.9 percent
50.2 percent
Combined Coded Results in Range
93.2 percent
[Demographics Dataset]
50.2 percent
74.8 percent
Linear (IQI Score)
Streaks in Relevance Near Median of Set
Linear (Relevance Score)
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3.8 
Machine Learning Approach  
to Level 2 Results 
In order to estimate the total number of ISIS-
supporting accounts on Twitter, we had to deal 
with the 2 million accounts at Level 2, the ac-
counts that were followed by Level 1 users but 
were not included in Level 0 or 1.
For Level 2, only user information could be di-
rectly collected, although data collected at Level 1 
enabled us to see how many Level 1 users followed 
a Level 2 account, as well as whether they had re-
ferred to a Level 2 user in a tweet. 
The data was insufficient to develop a complete 
picture of the number of ISIS supporters found in 
Level 2, which represents all users two hops away 
from the seeds at the time of the collection (friends 
of friends). Despite significant caveats for incom-
plete data, we tried several approaches and found 
wide variations in the results.
Twitter allows users to include a short personal 
description in their account profile, which is 
often helpful in deciding whether or not a 
given user is an ISIS supporter. While it is 
not practical to read each of the over 2 million 
profile descriptions collected for the census, 
we taught a machine learning model to analyze 
their contents.
Machine learning models need to be trained on 
sample data that has already been categorized. 
We used a set of roughly 6,000 accounts that 
had been hand-coded as either ISIS supporters or 
non-supporters. By focusing only on users who 
had explicitly declared their support for ISIS 
in the profile description, we trained the model 
to recognize words and sentence fragments that 
strongly correlate with ISIS support.
The model correctly deduced that Arabic words 
like succession, linger, Islamic State, Caliphate 
State or In Iraq are often present in the profiles 
of ISIS supporters (Figure 25). While this may 
seem obvious to human readers, this is an impor-
tant step in teaching a machine to read and cat-
egorize text. Note that the English translations 
in the chart are provided for reference, but the 
model was trained with Arabic text.
Figure 25: Selected phrases in an account profile that correlated to support or non-support of ISIS 
ISIS Support Indicators
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Succession
Linger
Islamic
Caliphate State
In Iraq
Believers
In Order to Maintain The
Believe and Do Good Works, 
and Exhort One Another
Indicates Non-support
Indicates ISIS Support
Relevance Score
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The model was 94% accurate in distinguishing be-
tween the profiles of supporters and non-support-
ers when tested against a set of 1,574 hand-coded 
accounts. However, 25–35% of users collected in 
the census did not supply a profile description, so 
the overall likelihood of identifying a supporter or 
non-supporter using only profile classification is 
closer to 70%. Furthermore, the machine learning 
approach, when employed without other network-
based constraints, produced a visibly noisy set that 
included many obviously non-responsive accounts. 
3.8.1 
Predicting Supporters
While useful, the machine learning model was 
not a silver bullet. Words can be misleading even 
when they are available. It is equally important to 
investigate the extent to which a user participates in 
networks of known or likely ISIS supporters. This 
concept of network participation is at the core of 
the IQI metric, which is the most accurate way we 
have found to identify ISIS supporters. 
Unfortunately, due to data access limits imposed 
by Twitter, it would take months or even years to 
collect the values required to calculate that metric 
with a large dataset.
Instead, we were forced to estimate using a subset 
of the data, including but not limited to the pro-
file classification score discussed above. We used 
another machine learning technique called feature 
selection to algorithmically determine which of the 
available metrics best correlate to a user being iden-
tified as an ISIS supporter or not.
The predictive model built using a wider range 
of features was only 80% accurate when tested 
on a set of 5,895 hand-coded accounts. For com-
parison, the IQI metric is 98% accurate on the 
same test set. Using this model, we would esti-
mate between 65,000 and 95,000 ISIS support-
ers amongst Level 2 users. 
However, relative to the criteria used in section 3.8 
for estimating Level 2, this figure seems consider-
ably higher than expected, as well as higher than 
anecdotal observations would support. A casual ex-
amination of some accounts that were scored as re-
sponsive found a relatively low proportion of overt 
ISIS supporters per our criteria. 
Any discrepancy may be due in part to extrapolat-
ing the results of the machine model against the 
coded samples—which are taken from a set con-
sisting of 65 to 75 percent ISIS supporters—to a 
group of 2 million, which even in the most aggres-
sive view contains less than 5 percent. Addition-
ally, many of the terms that correlated positively 
to ISIS support, such as caliphate and Islamic, are 
frequently used by non-supporters. 
In light of these factors, we opted to sort the set 
of the 66,000 most-responsive accounts according 
to the ratio of their in-network followers (mean-
ing followers in Level 0 and Level 1) to their total 
follower counts. This was evaluated using the same 
quick-coding method described in section 3.6, and 
yielded very encouraging results, if not as rigorous-
ly accurate as the full IQI method. 
Based on the findings—which roughly conformed 
to several other less rigorous approaches to craft-
ing an estimate—we project that there were a mini-
mum of 16,000 ISIS-supporting accounts in the 
Level 2 dataset. 
While the machine learning model left open the 
possibility that as many as 70,000 supporter ac-
counts might be found at Level 2, we believe this 
figure is too high to be credible. We also cannot 
rule out a significantly higher total in Level 2 if the 
models we employed were too conservative; how-
ever, we have seen no observational evidence to 
support an estimate at even the highest range we 
have provided. 
19. Barbara Starr and Adam Levine, “Panetta: Terrorists ‘Clearly’ Planned Benghazi Attacks,” CNN, September 27, 2012, http://
www.cnn.com/2012/09/27/world/africa/libya-consulate-attack.
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4. 
Conclusions: Pros and 
Cons of Suspending ISIS 
Supporters on Twitter
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This paper was motivated in part by a desire to 
better understand the impact of Twitter’s suspen-
sion of ISIS supporter accounts on the perfor-
mance and coherence of the overall network. An 
improved understanding would further inform 
the public debate over the value of suspensions. 
There are many stakeholders in this debate, in-
cluding free speech advocates, counterterrorism 
officials, CVE programs, journalists, and inde-
pendent researchers. 
The most important stakeholder in this debate 
is Twitter, the for-profit company that owns the 
social media platform and likely issues most of 
the decisions about which accounts will be sus-
pended. However, none of the stakeholders—not 
even Twitter, which appears to be subject to gov-
ernment requests for monitoring and mediating 
content—fully own the issue. 
Each stakeholder has different interests in the 
problem. Counterterrorism professionals, for in-
stance, may be highly interested in open-source 
intelligence about ISIS, whereas Twitter is not in 
the business of counterterrorism and has an in-
terest in protecting the privacy of its users. Some 
CVE programmers wish to project anti-extremist 
messaging into the ISIS space, while others pre-
fer to see potential avenues of radicalization—
including Twitter—closed down. Conversely, 
many open-source analysts following ISIS want 
easy access to information in order to avoid the 
elaborate and sometimes expensive procedures 
required to find less visible sources. 
Three crucial questions surround the debate over 
suspension of terrorist social media accounts in 
general, and ISIS accounts in particular. 
•	 Is it ethical to suppress political speech, even 
when such speech is repugnant?
•	Do suspensions destroy valuable sources 
of intelligence?
•	Do suspensions have a detrimental effect on 
targeted networks?
While the first cannot be directly addressed by 
this study, our research holds implications for 
the subsequent two questions. Debates over these 
issues have thus far relied heavily on anecdotal 
observations, strongly held opinions, and small 
data samples derived with relatively weak—or 
entirely undisclosed—methods. In these areas, 
this report can add contribute useful evidence to 
inform the debate. 
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There is clear intelligence value to be extracted 
from the ISIS accounts we examined. Although 
the volume of material created challenges in 
approaching this material systematically, the data 
analysis provided a number of clear insights. 
Most prominently, a significant number of 
accounts provided reliable GPS coordinates 
in ISIS territories. A subsequent data collec-
tion in late December 2014 detected even more 
relevant GPS coordinate data in Iraq and Syria, 
even as ISIS was warning its members against 
the practice. 
There are a number of intelligence applications 
for such data. For example, when we correlated 
the GPS data to other kinds of inferred geolo-
cation, we were able to identify Twitter profile 
categories where users are likely to lie or provide 
misleading information. In another example, us-
ers who are GPS-located to Iraq and Syria can 
be subjected to further social network analysis 
to estimate which of their online friends are also 
located there. This is only the tip of the iceberg. 
4.1 
Intelligence Value
The volume of collected tweets and the number 
of languages employed by users created prohibi-
tive obstacles to an algorithmic evaluation of the 
content posted within the time and budget of 
this project. We could, however, load the most 
relevant accounts in the Demographic Data-
set into a Twitter client and monitor the users 
over time, continuing a process that has involved 
thousands of ISIS-supporting accounts over the 
course of 2014. 
We have observed anecdotally that smaller ac-
counts often post material regarding local events 
as they were happening, and that medium-sized 
accounts often provide an early glimpse at ISIS 
media releases. 
Additionally, by monitoring the combined feeds on 
a large-screen TV, it was often possible to evalu-
ate—literally at a glance—the importance of new 
media material, themes, and issues. When ISIS 
releases important propaganda (such as the video 
showing the killing of Jordanian pilot Muaz al-
Figure 26: GPS-located tweets in Iraq and Syria, late December 2014
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Kasasbeh), the video can be seen propagating in a 
distinctive visual pattern on the screen, enabling a 
swift evaluation of its significance and whether it 
was an official release. 
Additional monitoring—alongside network analy-
sis to refine subgroupings in the set—would cer-
tainly improve this intelligence value. ISIS has tak-
en steps to ensure its operational security on social 
media, but it cannot accomplish its propaganda, 
recruitment, and operational missions on Twitter 
without exposing itself to scrutiny.
Our anecdotal observation indicates that the most 
valuable intelligence tends to emanate from the least 
obvious vectors, such as accounts with very small 
numbers of followers. The most active and visible ac-
counts contain more noise, and their content is more 
carefully stage-managed by ISIS and its adherents. 
Based on both anecdotal observation and ISIS social 
media strategy documents, original information tends 
to flow from more obscure accounts to more visible 
accounts such the mujtahidun, the core group of ISIS 
supporters devoted to disseminating information that 
originates elsewhere. 
The ability to accurately identify tens of thousands 
of ISIS supporters on Twitter provides ample room 
for the suspension of accounts that have strong op-
erational, recruitment, or propaganda value, with 
little or no functional loss of intelligence. 
From a purely instrumental counterterrorism 
point of view—without regard to the many other 
issues at play—the challenge is to sufficiently de-
grade the performance of the network to make 
a difference without driving the less visible and 
more valuable ISIS supporters out of the social 
network in large numbers. 
If every single ISIS supporter disappeared from 
Twitter tomorrow, it would represent a stagger-
ing loss of intelligence—assuming that intelli-
gence is in fact being mined effectively by some-
one somewhere. However, many thousands of 
accounts can likely be removed from the ecosys-
tem without having a dramatic negative impact 
on the potential intelligence yield. 
4.2 
Effectiveness of Suspensions in Limit-
ing ISIS’s Influence
As discussed in section 2.5, the data we collected did 
not provide an ideal point of comparison to evalu-
ate suspensions. In part, this was due to an aggres-
sive campaign of suspensions that began at the same 
time that we collected our initial data; this was further 
complicated by the weeks or months of collection 
time required to create an ideal comparison group. 
Nevertheless, the limited data we were able to col-
lect (section 2.5.4), as well as observational data, 
pointed to dramatic limits on ISIS activity online 
as a result of the ramped-up suspension regimen. 
Data collected at various times since September 2014 
consistently demonstrates that more than 8 percent of 
online activity by ISIS supporters is now being dedi-
cated to rebuilding the network (sections 1.10 and 
2.5.4). This figure measures only the promotion of 
new accounts and does not include abstract discussion 
of the suspensions, or discussions of strategies to com-
pensate for the negative effects of suspensions, such 
as the loss of intelligence data. Based on observations, 
we are confident such content—combined with the 
promotional tweets—now constitutes more than 10 
percent of ISIS supporters’ online activity. 
Additionally, we observed drops in activity such as 
replies and retweets within the network, although 
such data comes with significant caveats. ISIS sup-
porters themselves also characterized the effects of 
the suspensions as “devastating” in strategy docu-
ments, and repeatedly emphasized the importance 
of creating new accounts. 
Despite this, the number of new accounts created 
dropped significantly after the first round of sus-
pensions in September (section 2.5.4), and while 
we do not have complete data to make a positive 
assessment, it appears the pace of account cre-
ation has lagged behind the pace of suspensions. 
Most metrics within the network remained relatively 
flat for users who were not suspended. Despite the 
considerable discussion around the issue, the Demo-
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graphics Dataset saw a suspension rate of only 3.4 
percent between fall 2014 and January 2015. Based 
on the discrepancy between the suspension rate and 
the reports and discussions of suspensions in the con-
tent tweeted by supporters, we infer that many sus-
pensions have targeted accounts created by users who 
were returning after a previous suspension. We also 
saw some moves to suspend ISIS-supporting bots and 
other accounts involved in manipulative activity. 
Perhaps most important is what we didn’t see. We 
did not see images of beheaded hostages flooding 
unrelated hashtags or turning up in unrelated search 
results. We also did not see ISIS hashtags trend or 
aggregate widely. 
The primary ISIS hashtag—the group’s name in Ara-
bic—went from routinely registering in 40,000 tweets 
per day or more in around the time suspensions began 
in September 2014, to less than 5,000 on a typical day 
in February. Many of those tweets consisting of hostile 
messages sent by parties in the Persian Gulf. 
Some stakeholders have objected to account suspen-
sions on the basis the continuing availability of ISIS 
propaganda on social media and on the purported re-
silience of the ISIS social network.23 These represent a 
straw man argument, based on the idea that the cur-
rent level of suspensions is enough to destroy ISIS’s 
presence on social media and render its content com-
pletely unavailable. No one has suggested that this is 
the case. This argument is the equivalent of saying 
we should not arrest criminals, because crime keeps 
coming back. While there are many useful debates 
in society about the level and nature of law enforce-
ment, but there exists no legitimate argument in favor 
of abandoning law enforcement altogether because it’s 
just “whack-a-mole.” 
There are many potential alternative outcomes short 
of the total eradication of ISIS-affiliated accounts, 
and significantly degraded performance is certainly 
one of them. Specifically, neutering ISIS’s ability to 
use Twitter to broadcast its message outside of its 
core audience has numerous potential benefits in 
reducing the organization’s ability to manipulate 
public opinion and attract new recruits. 
The data we collected also suggests that the current 
rate of suspensions has also limited the ISIS network’s 
ability to grow and spread, a consideration almost 
universally ignored by critics of suspension tactics. 
The consequences of neglecting to weed a garden are 
obvious, even though weeds will always return. 
Our data indicates that progress has been made to-
ward limited and realistic goals at the current level 
of suspensions, which remains very low in compari-
son to the overall ISIS presence on Twitter (3.4 per-
cent of the Demographics Dataset, not counting 
users who have successfully created new accounts). 
Twitter has massive computing resources at its disposal, 
as well as access to user data at a much faster rate than 
permitted to outsiders. Using the techniques outlined 
in this paper, it is highly likely that Twitter could—if 
it so chose—substantially deny the use of its service 
to ISIS supporters, reducing their ranks to as few as 
a couple hundred hyper-committed supporters with 
negligible influence. For many reasons—including is-
sues associated with establishing a broad precedent on 
political speech and the practical intelligence concerns 
outlined in section 4.1—we do not recommend this 
approach. However, it remains theoretically possible. 
It is also possible to fine tune the current suspensions 
efforts to further limit Twitter’s utility to ISIS, with-
out completely eliminating the group’s presence. For 
instance, given the large number of small accounts in 
the system, we believe it would be possible to design 
metrics (following established ideas such as between-
ness centrality,24 which describes the how a user in 
the network bridges between other users) that could 
be used to dismantle the network by separating these 
small accounts into ever smaller clusters of users, and 
disrupting the flow of information among them. 
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While Twitter does not publicly discuss its 
rationale for suspensions, it can be deduced 
that it primarily suspends accounts based on the 
content of tweets and user reports. This approach 
tends to favor accounts that are more visible and 
more active, consistent with our findings. Twit-
ter could choose to approach the issue proactive-
ly with an eye toward dismantling the network 
rather than putting out fires as they spring up. 
There are obvious ethical dimensions when a private 
company decides to tackle a thematic network; this 
research cannot inform these discussions. To some ex-
tent, regulating ISIS per se presents very few ethical di-
lemmas, given its extreme violence and deliberate ma-
nipulation of social media techniques. However, the 
decision to limit the reach of one organization in this 
manner creates a precedent, and in future cases, the 
lines will almost certainly be less clear and bright. 
Figure 27: A network graph of interactions among members of the February 2015 collection set, reflecting  
the impact of months of suspensions. The lower portion of the graph shows a high density of interactions within  
the most-connected members of the set; while peripheral members in the upper section are much less connected. 
As suspensions contract the network, members increasingly talk to each other rather than to outsiders. 
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4.3 
Suspensions and Trade-offs
While the current debate over the value of account 
suspensions leaves much to be desired, our research 
identified one unintended consequence that merits 
serious consideration as an argument against main-
taining a program of suspensions. One effect of sus-
pending more visible ISIS accounts is that the net-
work becomes more internally focused over time. 
While our data was insufficient to fully address this 
question, the process of trying to create the February 
2015 comparison set described in section 2.5.4 vividly 
illustrated this change in dynamic. We made several 
attempts to develop a network of similar size to the 
original collection with new seeds, only to be met 
with frustration. There was substantial overlap in the 
accounts followed by the new seed accounts, pointing 
toward a much more inwardly focused network, even 
as the average number of followers increased. 
Much of what follows is observational, although 
future research may be able to quantify the ef-
fects. We suspect that as the network comes under 
mounting pressure, ISIS supporters will increasing-
ly follow and interact with other supporters, and 
will be less and less inclined to follow and interact 
with people outside the supporter network. The re-
peated suspension of the most visible accounts has 
the effect of peeling away many users who are less 
engaged with ISIS and its ideology. In short, ISIS 
social networks on Twitter are becoming even more 
insular than they were to begin with. 
There are potential hazards here. 
First, ISIS supporters who have more out-of-net-
work relationships may be exposed to moderating 
or deradicalizing influences. While ISIS’s status as 
the most extreme Islamic radical group raises very 
legitimate doubts about whether the majority of 
adherents are even vulnerable to moderating in-
fluences, we have seen examples of people turning 
away from its toxic ideology.25 When we segregate 
members of ISIS social networks, we are, to some 
extent, also closing off potential exit ramps. 
Secondly, while the suspensions raise the barrier to 
joining the social network—in the sense that they 
reduce the number of invitations ISIS can success-
fully broadcast—they do not by any means make 
joining impossible. The interior of this network is 
changing as a result of the suspensions, making it a 
much louder echo chamber. 
The increased stridency and monotonic content 
may discourage some new members of the network 
from remaining. For others, there is a risk that the 
more focused and coherent group dynamic could 
speed and intensify the radicalization process. 
Prior to the advent of social media, al-Qa’ida training 
camps practiced cult-like techniques of indoctrina-
tion which included cutting new recruits off from the 
outside world. While the barriers to outside engage-
ment in a virtual environment are obviously far more 
porous, the segregation of ISIS’s social network may 
create a smaller but similar effect. In some ways, this 
effect may be more pernicious as it creates the illusion 
of access to unfiltered information, when in fact ISIS 
news sources are extraordinarily filtered and biased. 
This allows ISIS to powerfully manipulate the selec-
tion of information its adherents can access. 
This concern, however, must be weighed against 
other ISIS strategies, most notably its effort to en-
courage so-called “lone wolf” attacks by people 
who are only marginally engaged with its ideology 
and political cause.26 Some lone actors—such as 
those who carried out attacks in Canada in Octo-
ber27—have been fully engaged with ISIS social 
networks. Others—such as the man who attacked 
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New York police with a hatchet28—were less visibly 
engaged and may be more psychologically similar 
to spree killers than to traditional conceptions of 
networked terrorists. 
Regardless of where on the spectrum such individ-
uals lie, research indicates that mental illness plays 
a significant role in lone-actor terrorism, and ISIS’s 
ultraviolent propaganda provides an unusually high 
level of stimulation to those who might already be 
prone to violence. 
While it is relatively easy for someone with knowl-
edge of Iraqi and Syrian social networks and infor-
mation outlets to find such graphically violent ISIS 
content, the suspensions do provide some degree of 
buffer against mentally ill individuals who might 
seek out images of sadistic violence to strengthen 
their own violent impulses, particularly in Eng-
lish. Again, this is not to say that such material is 
unavailable, but pressure on ISIS’s social networks 
does reduce the distribution of such material to 
people who do not have a specialized interest. 
Fundamentally, the questions raised here pertain 
to the largely unacknowledged fact that tampering 
with social networks is a form of social engineering. 
There are considerations that go beyond the instru-
mental question of how ISIS spreads propaganda 
and recruits, cutting to the heart of how social radi-
calization works and raising questions about un-
intended consequences. Additional study of these 
issues should be a top priority. 
4.4 
Preliminary Policy Recommendations 
No single authority possesses the scope and power 
to fully address the challenges presented by the 
presence of ISIS and other similar groups on so-
cial media. There are, however, stakeholders, and 
each must answer questions about their own inter-
nal priorities in this conflict. To achieve progress, 
stakeholders must come together in an organized 
way to discuss potential solutions. Although this 
study has examined Twitter and ISIS in particular, 
the issues and dynamics laid out here also apply to 
other social media platforms and other groups ex-
erting negative social impact, such as white nation-
alists, whose networks on Twitter have developed 
substantially since the previously referenced 2013 
study “Who Matters Online.” 
Social media platforms must first ask themselves 
where their responsibilities lie. While we do not 
believe that any mainstream social media platform 
wishes to see its services used to further acts of hor-
rific violence, we also suspect some would rather 
not be bothered with the challenge of crafting a 
broad and coherent response to the issue. 
While we can sympathize with the challenges and di-
lemmas such a response would entail, it is clear that 
social media companies do feel an obligation to re-
spond to some social standards and illegal uses of their 
services. We are not aware of any major company that 
takes a hands-off approach to the use of its platform 
to promote child pornography or human traffick-
ing—or less dramatically, phishing, spam, fraud, and 
copyright violations. Extremism, while raising thorn-
ier issues, merits attention, especially when faced with 
a rising challenge of violent groups who manipulate 
platforms to reap the rewards of spreading images of 
their cruelty. Some platforms—notably Facebook and 
YouTube—have already instituted policy changes spe-
cific to extremism. 
Social media platforms should consider whether 
they want to continue with some variation of 
their current approach, which tends to stomp 
out fires as they erupt, or whether they want to 
dismantle or degrade the social networks respon-
sible for setting the fires. While we do not nec-
essarily recommend that social media platforms 
take the network-wide approach, it should none-
theless be examined and considered in greater 
depth using social network analysis techniques 
such as those featured in this study. 
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By understanding the power and the limits of a 
holistic approach to network degradation, we can 
better understand what approaches might be most 
effective and least intrusive. Such study should also 
examine in depth how isolating extremist commu-
nities may have counterproductive effects. 
Social media platforms have thus far been able to 
take shelter in a presumption that their platforms 
are protected as Internet service providers under 
laws written to exempt the phone company from 
liability for illegal acts carried out using a phone 
(such as using a phone to arrange a purchase of 
drugs). Given that social media platforms have the 
capacity to broadcast messages akin to a television 
or radio broadcast, the law may eventually change 
to keep up with the evolution of technology.
Nevertheless, even telephones are regulated for 
antisocial content. For instance, telephone harass-
ment is illegal in all 50 states,29 but social media 
harassment is not, despite the fact that using social 
media to transmit pictures of gory executions can 
be more intrusive and pernicious than some behav-
iors banned under telephone statutes. 
It is unwise for social media companies to pre-
sume they will remain immune to regulation. 
Companies should get out ahead of the curve by 
crafting policies and publicly articulating their 
priorities. If they do not bring their vision to the 
government, the government is likely to bring a 
much more restrictive vision to them. 
Government, for its part, must do something it has 
not traditionally excelled at: fully address a complex 
situation and attempt to find a nuanced approach. 
Most obviously, social media is embedded with a 
component of free speech, and in recent years has 
drawn attention to international crises and fostered 
popular dissent in authoritarian societies. 
Any attempt to establish sweeping authority over 
political speech on social media comes with po-
tentially high risks, and laws tuned specifically to 
ISIS are problematic on multiple levels. Given that 
the major social media platforms are based in the 
United States, the U.S. government has the most 
obvious authority over how these companies are 
managed. Nonetheless, the government also has an 
obligation—embedded in our constitutional prin-
ciples—to protect users and the companies them-
selves from authoritarian abuse. 
Discussions of the regulation of speech on social 
media platforms tend to emphasize libertarian val-
ues and the protection of free speech from govern-
ment intrusion. However, the legal vacuum that 
currently surrounds these issues is a de facto con-
cession of near-absolute authority to corporations, 
rather than the empowerment of users. 
This point needs to be crystal clear: social media 
companies can and do control speech on their plat-
forms. No user of a mainstream social media ser-
vice enjoys an environment of complete freedom. 
Instead, companies apply a wide range of condi-
tions limiting speech, using possibly opaque guide-
lines that may result in decisions executed on an ad 
hoc basis. Furthermore, companies typically do not 
disclose information about who they suspend and 
why, nor are they required to. 
There are many attendant questions that should be 
of interest to civil libertarians. These include, for 
example, whether suspensions disproportionately 
impact people of certain genders, races, nationali-
ties, sexual orientations, or religions. Twitter in par-
ticular discloses literally no information about the 
accounts it suspends, yet this activity takes place 
every day. Again, this is an area in which companies 
would be well-advised to consider proactive mea-
sures, and it is an area where government oversight 
may eventually come into play. 
It is apparent that progress will only be made 
when these two largest stakeholders—private 
sector providers and the government—come to-
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gether and discuss the many legitimate concerns 
on both sides. 
This process should include input from other stake-
holders as well, including experts in extremism and 
violent extremism, victims of extremist violence, 
activists working to counter extremism, scholars 
of political dissent, and advocates of civil liberties. 
Any one-sided or even binary solution—conceived 
of and imposed primarily by some combination of 
government and corporations—will likely to be in-
adequate to deal with the complex issues raised by 
the problem of extremist use of social media. 
4.5 
Research recommendations 
We close by emphasizing the our belief that while 
this research significantly advances the state of 
knowledge about the functioning of extremist 
social networks, it does not present a complete 
picture of the effects of suspending social media 
accounts used by extremists. We faced two sig-
nificant challenges, which could be remedied in 
future studies using similar methodologies. 
First, due to the timing of the study, we were un-
able to create a dataset that could serve as a control 
group for how ISIS functions in a low-suspension 
environment. Aggressive suspensions started at the 
same time that we began collecting data. 
The most likely implication of this limitation is 
that we have understated the impact of aggres-
sive suspensions in degrading the performance of 
ISIS social networks. Various data points collect-
ed opportunistically by J.M. Berger since 2013, 
such as hashtag trends, tend to support this view. 
It may be possible to draw on commercially 
available Twitter data to create a historical com-
parison dataset that would provide a certain de-
gree of improved resolution on this question. 
Ultimately, based on the limitations of the cur-
rent commercial offerings, the only approach 
to creating a comprehensive comparison would 
require the disclosure of data held internally by 
Twitter, a prospect that seems unlikely. 
Second, this research clearly points to possible 
methodologies for actively monitoring the evolu-
tion of ISIS’s social network over time, allowing 
for much more precise evaluations of the number 
of suspensions occurring over time, and the short 
and long term effects of those suspensions. 
A project of this sort would create a massive res-
ervoir of open-source data on ISIS and its use of 
social media, and it is technically feasible barring 
a sea change in Twitter’s rules for data access. 
Additional study would provide a much clearer 
view on how the network responds to suspensions, 
how it evolves, and how its internal social dynamics 
change over time. We hope that the detailed disclo-
sure of the methodology used to develop this report 
and its utility for future research will advance the 
study of social network dynamics in general, and 
extremist use of social media in particular. 
In principle, the best approach this problem 
would be to run an analysis similar to that used 
in this study on an iterative and continuing ba-
sis—after addressing some technical challenges, 
including the size of the dataset and the amount 
of time required for collection. Analysts could 
then define new seed accounts from the collect-
ed data, according to replicable criteria, run the 
complete analysis, and then create new seeds us-
ing the same criteria and run the analysis again. 
The first iteration of this process would likely cre-
ate a meaningfully different data set, due to the 
original seeds being chosen using manual selec-
tion by a human analyst; subsequent iterations 
would likely become more uniform and more 
directly comparable, with changes to the dataset 
reflecting the organic evolution of the network. 
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A.
Notes on In-Network Calculations
User information is available more quickly via the 
Twitter application programming interface (API) 
than information about friends and followers, 
which is considerably slower to collect. The rate at 
which friend and follower information can be col-
lected is significantly limited by Twitter and cannot 
be negotiated. 
This proved relevant to the final multiplier in the 
metric, in which the number of out-network friends 
and followers were computed using the database 
record for “total friends” and “total followers.” We 
collected more friends than the “total friends” entry 
for 7.3 percent of users. For followers, the figure 
was 1.6 percent. 
The discrepancy was lower for followers because 
the in-network followers was collected from user 
information, which was weighted toward identify-
ing friend relationships. In-network followers were 
computed by looking at how many people within 
the network had listed the user as a friend. 
This introduced some bias into the metrics due to 
the fact that collection was spaced out over time. 
In other words, if a user was collected early in the 
process, the discrepancy between the database entry 
and the in-network calculations would tend to be 
lower; if the user was collected later in the process, 
it would tend to be higher. 
Having not fully anticipated this issue or the im-
portance of in/out metrics in advance of collec-
tion, we were unable to account for the discrep-
ancy manually. If we had anticipated it, we could 
have made structural changes to the collection 
process to partially compensate. By the time the 
significance of the discrepancy became clear, the 
challenges of trying to regressively account for 
the change outweighed the benefits.
This was in part because the discrepancy ultimately 
proved advantageous. When an account added a 
substantial number of in-network relationships in 
the intervening time between collection of user 
information and collection of relationships, the 
velocity itself became a partial indicator of the rel-
evance of the account: in other words, highly rel-
evant accounts added relationships faster than less 
relevant ones. Since the metric used several other 
characteristics to evaluate responsiveness, other 
data was available to offset the possible negative 
consequences while still gaining some of the ben-
efits. Some inherent bias related to the timing of 
collection is likely unavoidable under Twitter’s cur-
rent terms of service for API access. 
In future projects, by estimating the velocity at 
which in-network friends were added, it might be 
possible to improve the accuracy of the process of 
sorting accounts. However, this approach—and the 
associated caveats—are almost certainly more ap-
plicable to ISIS supporters than to general inter-
est queries, due to the highly organized manner in 
which ISIS builds its network, and the rather spe-
cific behaviors related to the aggressive suspension 
of supporter accounts. 
Appendices
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We tested the sorting metric on a non-extremist 
dataset, using four prominent data journalists as 
seed accounts, to determine whether it would ef-
fectively sort data journalists (a much more specific 
subset than ISIS supporters) and people interested 
in data journalism from the larger social network of 
accounts followed by the seed users. The object was 
to provide a comparison group to the ISIS analysis, 
and also to explore the utility of the metric outside 
of extremist networks. 
For a quick evaluation, we coded as responsive hits 
accounts with a profile description that included 
the word data combined with one of the follow-
ing terms: journalist, journalism and reporter. The 
IQI metric (without the adjustment for non-reply 
mentions) again proved considerably more effective 
B.
Control Group
than other metrics, although slightly less effective 
than it was in sorting ISIS supporters. 
Extremist groups are by nature insular. Members pre-
fer to get news and information from other members 
of the group, and their desire for interactions tends to 
be contained within the group (ISIS’s external broad-
cast of propaganda as a notable exception).
We attribute the difference in effectiveness to this 
element, although it may also be related to the fact 
that the data journalist set was considerably smaller 
than the ISIS set. We suspect additional data would 
contribute to a more accurate sorting process, like-
ly by weighting lower-ranked responsive accounts 
more accurately through the collection of more 
members of their networks. 
Figure 28: The data journalist set sorted 1) alphabetically, 2) by engagement, 3) using the IQI metric
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